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DANIELE. HERZ-ROIPHEt & DAVID SINGH GREWAL:j: 
"Sunrise amendments"-constitutional provisions that only take effect after a sub-
stantial time delay-could revolutionize American politics. Yet they remain 
undertheorized and unfamiliar. This Article presents the first comprehensive exam-
ination of sunrise lawmaking. It first explores a theoretical puzzle. On the one 
hand, sunrise lawmaking resuscitates the possibility of using Article V amendments 
to forge "a more perfect union" by inducing disinterested behavior from legislators. 
On the other, it exacerbates the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" inherent in all 
constitutional lawmaking. When one generation passes a law that affects exclusively 
its successors, it sidesteps the traditional forms of democratic accountability that 
constrain and legitimate the legislative process. The Article accordingly argues that 
while sunrise lawmaking holds considerable promise, it should be confined to 
"democracy-enhancing" reforms that increase future generations' capacity to 
govern themselves. With this normative framework in place, the Article turns to the 
question of how time delays have actually been used in American constitutional 
history. It identifies six different instances of sunrise lawmaking in the U.S. 
Constitution. It argues that several of these illustrate how sunrise lawmaking can 
enhance the democratic character of American government, but at least one offers a 
cautionary tale of how temporal dislocation in constitutional lawmaking can have 
pernicious consequences. 
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INTRODUCTION: THREE IMPOSSIBLE REFORMS 
A striking feature of modern American politics is that the 
Constitution often appears to stand in the way of democracy. Con-
sider three familiar examples: 
Congressional representation for the District of Columbia: Article 
I provides that only "States" receive representation in the Senate and 
House of Representatives.1 As a result, the nearly 650,000 residents of 
the District of Columbia have no voting representative in Congress.2 
This despite the fact that the District has a larger population than two 
fully represented states (Wyoming and Vermont), and contributes 
more federal tax revenue than fourteen. 3 A Washington Post poll 
found that Americans support granting representation to the District 
by a more than two-to-one margin.4 And multiple international orga-
nizations have explicitly condemned the United States for failing to 
provide the District's citizens with full rights of political participation.5 
The Electoral College: Pursuant to Article II, Section 1, the 
United States elects its chief executive through the Electoral College, 
I U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3. 
2 They do have a single nonvoting representative. See CONGRESSWOMAN ELEANOR 
HOLMES NoRTON, http://norton.house.gov (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). 
3 Louis Jacobson, D.C. Voting-Rights Post Offers Hit-and-Miss Data, PounFAcr 
(Feb. 6, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2013/feb/06/ 
facebook-posts/dc-voting-rights-post-offers-hit-and-miss-data/. 
4 Washington Post Poll, WASH. PosT (Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll_042307.html. 
5 See Press Release, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Congresswoman, District of Columbia, 
Norton Says Latest UN Human Rights Committee Criticism of U.S. Treaty Violation on 
D.C. Voting Rights Calls for Urgent Action from the Administration and Congress (Mar. 
28, 2014), http://norton.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/norton-says-latest-un-
human-rights-committee-criticism-of-us-treaty. 
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review 
December 2015] MAKE ME DEMOCRATIC, BUT NOT YET 1977 
a convoluted and idiosyncratic system employed by no other democ-
racy in the world.6 On four separate occasions, this electoral system 
has put presidential candidates who lost the national popular vote into 
the White House.7 The Electoral College once served the interests of 
southern slaveholders8 and currently gives outsize importance to 
voters lucky enough to live in states that are small or have electorates 
more or less evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans. But 
it is unclear that the system serves the country as a whole. In fact, 
nearly two thirds of Americans now support eliminating the Electoral 
College,9 and the figure has hovered around sixty to eighty percent 
since World War II.10 
Equal representation in the Senate: Article II, Section 3 mandates 
that each state receive two senators. This uniform allocation grants the 
same senatorial representation to political units of dramatically dif-
ferent population. It also stands in stark contrast to the apportionment 
practices of many other democracies. In highly egalitarian Austria, for 
instance, no voter has more than 1.5 times the political clout of any of 
her fellow citizens by virtue of where she lives. In the United States, 
by contrast, a resident of Wyoming has 66 times more representation 
in the Senate than a resident of California. This makes the U.S. Senate 
the fourth-most malapportioned legislative chamber in the entire 
world.11 According to the Congressional Quarterly, in one out of 
every ten legislative votes in the Senate between 1990 and 2010, the 
losing side actually represented more American citizens.12 
6 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITfEN CoNSTITUTioN: THE PRECEDENTS 
AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 471 (2012) {"If the federal electoral college is so good, why 
does no state (or foreign country, for that matter) closely follow it?"). 
7 The years were 1824, 1876, 1888, and 2000. D'Angelo Gore, Presidents Winning 
Without Popular Vote, FACTCHECK.0RG {Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.factcheck.org/2008/ 
03/presidents-winning-without-popular-vote/. 
8 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 97-98 (2006) 
{discussing the Electoral College's place in a system of "proslavery malapportionment" 
that "helps explain the proslavery tilt of antebellum American law and politics"). 
9 Lydia Saad, Americans Call for Term Limits, End to Electoral College, GALLUP (Jan. 
18, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159881/americans-call-term-limits-end-electoral-
college.aspx. 
10 Gallup Polls: Consistent Super-Majority Support for a National Popular Vote, 
FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/electoral_college/Gallup_Polls.pdf {last visited Oct. 
20, 2015) (presenting a summary of Gallup Polls over the past several decades). 
11 See Adam Liptak, Smaller States Find Outsize Clout Growing in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/in teractive/2013/03/11/us/poli tics/ democracy-tested.html {last 
visited Oct. 28, 2015). 
12 See id. Note that each of the above undemocratic features of the Constitution are 
"hard-wired" into it, to use Sanford Levinson's term-because they are the product of 
clear, unambiguous constitutional text, they are relatively immune to change through 
creative judicial construction. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OuR UNDEMOCRATIC 
CoNsTITUTioN: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GoEs WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE 
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There is an irony to this state of affairs-at least if viewed from 
the perspective of "democratic constitutionalism," which we take as 
our normative orientation in this Article. Democratic constitution-
alism understands the Constitution as the product of an unprece-
dented experiment in democratic self-government.13 In creating a 
framework of fundamental law, touted by its proponents as "purely 
democratical"14 and put to the people collectively for ratification, the 
founding generation put to the test theories of popular sovereignty 
developed by generations of radical political philosophers working in 
the social contract tradition.1s 
Nevertheless, many governmental structures established by the 
Constitution seem to violate the political ideal of "one person, one 
vote"16 on which the document's claim to democratic legitimacy 
rests-and the supermajority requirements for amendment make 
these structures difficult to change.17 In past generations, dramatic 
political reforms have been achieved through the Article V amend-
ment process-for example, the expansions of the franchise in the 
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments-but contemporary partisan 
gridlock seems to preclude such transformative amendments. In its 
place, scholars and activists now focus on non-Article V amendment 
processes,18 or call for new constitutional conventions,19 and have lost 
confidence in the textually prescribed mechanism for constitutional 
change. 
This Article explores a promising technique for achieving funda-
mental political reforms without abandoning the Article V amend-
ment process or the traditions of democratic self-government and 
popular sovereignty that the Constitution was meant to realize. It rests 
on an old hope: that no matter how bitterly divisive everyday politics 
may be, lawmakers-including ordinary citizens approving constitu-
CAN CoRREcr IT) 29 (2006) ("I am interested almost exclusively in what I am terming the 
'hard-wired' parts of the Constitution. These include bicameralism and, most important, 
the indefensibly apportioned Senate, which gives equal voting power to Wyoming and 
California alike."). 
13 See AMAR, supra note 8, at 5 (describing the creation and ratification of the 
Constitution in 1787 as "the most democratic deed the world had ever seen"). 
14 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 484 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter 2 ELLIOT'S 
DEBATES). 
15 See infra Part II.A. 
16 Cf Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563-64 (1964) ("To say that a vote is worth more 
in one district than in another would ... run counter to our fundamental ideas of 
democratic government .... " (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
17 See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
18 For a discussion of non-Article V amendment proposals, see infra Part II.B. 
19 See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 11-13 (calling for a new constitutional 
convention to address democratic deficiencies in American government). 
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review 
De,.,ember 2015] MAKE ME DEMOCRATIC, BUT NOT YET 1979 
tional changes-are capable of surmounting parochial interests and 
promoting the general welfare when planning for the distant future. 
As Gouverneur Morris eloquently put it at the Philadelphia 
Convention, when we create constitutional provisions that will last for 
decades, or even centuries, our perspective should "be enlarged to the 
true interest of man, instead of being circumscribed within the narrow 
compass of a particular Spot. "20 
In practice, this lofty aspiration is often no match for the imme-
diate need for constitutional lawmakers-who are, after all, usually 
elected politicians-to satisfy their constituents. But what if, rather 
than trying to change the Constitution today, we instead attempted to 
amend it for the distant future by imposing time lags between the 
moment when new constitutional provisions were enacted and when 
they took effect? Perhaps, when freed from current exigencies, consti-
tutional lawmakers would trade narrow conceptions of present self-
interest for the broad-minded perspective that Morris advocated. 
Several earlier scholars have, in passing, raised just this possi-
bility. The philosopher Jon Elster has suggested that since implemen-
tation delays make it difficult to foresee who will profit from any 
given reform, they create "a veil of ignorance that forces an agent to 
put himself in everybody's place and thus reduces the importance of 
interest."21 He speculates that constitutional drafters whose decisions 
only go into effect years-or even decades-later may find it easier to 
"legislate in the interest of all and for the indefinite future" and ignore 
the "short-term and partisan motives imposed on them by their con-
stituencies. "22 Legal scholar Akhil Amar is even more hopeful and 
has put the possibility of what he calls "sunrise" lawmaking forcefully 
on the agenda of constitutional theory. In a recent book, he advocates 
widespread use of "a different species of rules that should properly go 
into effect-that should 'sunrise'-only after a substantial time 
delay."23 He claims that such "sunrise amendments" would transform 
the character of constitutional debates, allowing "[j]ustice-seeking 
reformers" to "ultimately prevail in time, using time" to accomplish a 
variety of important goals.24 
20 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 530-31 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911) [hereinafter 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS]. 
21 JoN ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 146 (2000). 
22 Id. at 144. 
23 AMAR, supra note 6, at 474; see also id. at 474-77 (discussing the promise of sunrise 
lawmaking further). 
24 Id. at 474. For a recent article that explores some of the transformative reforms that 
could be achieved through sunrise lawmaking, see Edward B. Foley, The Posterity Project: 
Developing a Method for Long-Term Political Reform, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
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Yet for all its promise, sunrise lawmaking remains under-
explored.25 Scholars have yet to consider in detail the ways in which 
writing tomorrow's constitution today both ameliorates and exacer-
bates the internal tensions of democratic constitutionalism. Nor has 
anyone so far analyzed the many important uses of time lags 
throughout U.S. constitutional history or the relationship between 
sunrise lawmaking and longstanding questions of constitutional 
theory.26 This Article attempts to fill these gaps. 
Sunrise lawmaking poses a particular puzzle for democratic con-
stitutionalism. On the one hand, it can be used to enlarge the sphere 
of democratic participation when short-term vested interests might 
otherwise stand in the way, thus enabling a fuller realization of 
democracy within the existing constitutional frame. On the other, it 
amplifies the central tension between the logic of democracy and the 
logic of constitutionalism-the famous "dead hand" problem that 
arises when one generation's decisions bind another's. Under a sun-
rise amendment, the generation that makes constitutional law does 
not propose to live under the reforms it enacts for the future. This 
creates an absence of democratic accountability that does not exist 
with other forms of constitutional (or ordinary) lawmaking, all of 
which require legislators to live under the laws they pass. 
From the perspective of democratic constitutionalism, we argue, 
there are normatively desirable and undesirable ways to use this tech-
25 Amar is the first to enthusiastically endorse the use of delayed amendments to 
achieve beneficial constitutional reforms (and Elster seems to have been the first to 
consider how this could work), but the proposal belongs to a tradition of scholarship that 
explores the effects of veils of ignorance and time delays in constitutional law. Other 
scholars have examined how placing lawmakers behind veils of ignorance in ordinary 
legislative contexts can have salutary effects, see, e.g., Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be 
Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 M1cH. L. 
REv. 917 (1990), and explored the ways in which the Constitution creates such veils of 
ignorance, see Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE 
L.J. 399 (2001). Still more have emphasized how the long time horizon on which 
constitutions operate keeps constitutional lawmakers from being able to guess reliably 
what the direct effects of many constitutional provisions will be, which can facilitate the 
process of drafting. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GoRDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS 
OF CONSENT 78 (1962) ("[U]ncertainty that is required in order for the individual to be led 
by his own interest to support constitutional provisions that are generally advantageous ... 
seems likely to be present at any constitutional stage of discussion."). 
26 While the historical focus of our Article is on the American experience, we hope our 
analysis of delayed constitutional change and its relationship to democratic 
constitutionalism will be of general relevance to scholars of comparative law and 
constitutional theory. For a comparative-constitutional analysis of Article V, see Richard 
Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94 B.U. L. REv. 1029, 
1037-40 (2014). See also Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment 
Rules, 49 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 913 (2014) (performing a comparative analysis of the 
structure of formal amendment rules across different constitutional regimes). 
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nique of constitutional lawmaking. Since sunrise lawmakers are not 
constrained by one of the most important traditional mechanisms of 
democratic accountability-the requirement that they and their con-
stituents actually live under the laws they authorize-they can only 
legislate legitimately if they understand themselves as trustees for 
their successors, who must one day assume autonomy.27 This relation-
ship obligates current decisionmakers to use sunrise lawmaking only 
when doing so will enhance subsequent generations' ability to govern 
themselves democratically. Sunrise lawmakers can either fulfill or vio-
late this obligation through what we call "democracy-enhancing" or 
"democracy-restricting" measures. The latter can result from attempts 
at open intergenerational exploitation or from benevolent, but mis-
guided, attempts at paternalistic control of the future's political deci-
sions. Either violates the trustee relationship in which the present 
generation stands to its progeny. 
From this normative orientation we are able to review the text 
and history of the U.S. Constitution, identifying its "sunrise clauses" 
and classifying them according to our framework. We discuss six pro-
visions in the Constitution that have sunrise features: the Slave 
Importation Clause of Article I, Section 9, which delayed Congress's 
power to regulate the slave trade by twenty years; the Natural Born 
Citizen Clause of Article II, Section 1, which excluded future, but not 
present, immigrants from running for President; the Eighteenth 
Amendment, which delayed the start of Prohibition; the Twentieth 
and Twenty-Second Amendments, which pushed back electoral 
reforms so that they would not affect incumbent officials; and the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which required legislators to insert time 
lags into any congressional pay increases. In most of these instances, 
drafters used temporal dislocation to enhance the democratic char-
acter of the American constitutional order. But in crafting one notable 
constitutional provision-the Natural Born Citizen Clause-the 
Framers appear to have engaged in democracy-restricting sunrise law-
making, probably for reasons of misguided paternalism rather than 
intergenerational exploitation, but with important and pernicious con-
sequences nonetheless. 
With this mixed historical record in mind, we offer a qualified 
endorsement of sunrise lawmaking. Without it, or some similar inno-
vation, faith in democratic constitutionalism will only wane further, as 
the political paralysis that blocks most efforts to amend the Constitu-
27 This accords with Kant's conception of a guardian's responsibilities towards its 
wards. See infra note 157. 
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tion through the Article V process shows no signs of receding.2s Yet 
sunrise lawmaking also presents the risk that we will betray democ-
racy in our attempts to realize it. Like all double-edged swords, it must 




Sunrise lawmaking is best understood by comparison to its mirror 
image: sunset lawmaking. Sunset clauses-provisions that terminate 
automatically after a fixed period of time unless expressly 
reauthorized-have played an important role in American politics 
since the founding.29 Article I of the Constitution itself mandates that 
all military appropriations must sunset within two years.30 And by the 
dawn of the twenty-first century, sunset provisions had spread to 
many other areas of legislative practice as well.31 The USA Patriot 
Act of 2001, for example, established special executive authorities that 
sunset after four years,32 while the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 imposed a ten-year assault weapons ban, 
which lawmakers subsequently allowed to lapse.33 Sunset provisions 
are especially popular in tax legislation, with the temporary credit for 
research and development34 and the Bush tax cuts of 200135 offering 
notable examples. 
28 For an extended discussion of modern congressional gridlock and its implications, 
see Symposium, The American Congress: Legal Implications of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 2065 (2013). For a classic analysis of how legislation works in government with 
divided party control, see DAVID R. MAYHEW, D1vIDED WE GovERN: PARTY CONTROL, 
LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-2002, at 1-7 (2d ed. 2005). 
29 See Sunset Law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1665 (10th ed. 2014) (defining a "sunset 
law" as a "statute under which a governmental agency or program automatically 
terminates at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally renewed"). For a discussion of 
sunset techniques in legislation and regulation, which draws on comparative sources, see 
SOFIA RANCHORDAS, CONSTITUTIONAL SUNSETS AND EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION 
(2014). 
30 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8 ("[N]o appropriation of money to [raise and support armies] 
shall be for a longer term than two years .... "). 
31 For a review of this history, and a skeptical critique of the virtues of sunset 
provisions, see Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (2011). 
32 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2004) (amended 2001). 
33 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110, 108 Stat. 1796, 2000. 
34 See Helping Small Business Innovators Through the Research and Experimentation 
Tax Credit: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement 
of Rep. Nye, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Contracting & Tech.) (explaining how the credit 
"has been reauthorized 1 year at a time, often at the last minute, retroactively, and after 
the credit has expired" for more than three decades). 
35 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 § 901(a), 26 U.S.C. § 1 
(2006) (amended 2002 & 2012) (repealed 2013). 
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At first glance, the difference between sunrise and sunset law-
making may seem merely formal or semantic. For example, while the 
2001 Bush tax cuts instituted rate reductions that sunset after ten 
years,36 one could easily imagine a functionally similar legislative pro-
gram of increased marginal rates that "sunrised" after the same time 
period. Both would allow legislators to establish a lower set of mar-
ginal rates for the immediate future and a different, higher set of mar-
ginal rates for all subsequent years. 
Yet there are important distinctions between the two possibilities. 
To illustrate them, suppose that the legislature of Momingland, which 
has a flat tax rate of 15%, adopts a "sunrise tax increase" that raises 
the rate to 20% beginning in ten years. Meanwhile, the lawmakers of 
Eveningland, which has a flat tax rate of 20%, adopt a "sunset tax cut" 
that lowers the rate to 15 % for the next ten years. From the perspec-
tive of a taxpayer, the two legal regimes are indistinguishable. 
Morning/and 
Evening/and 





But something meaningfully different has happened across the 
two states. The legislators of Momingland have opted to maintain the 
present status quo for the next ten years before making a change. 
They have thus chosen a default for the present and a new policy for 
the future. The lawmakers of Eveningland, by contrast, have adopted 
a new policy for the present and a reversion to a pre-existing default 
for the future. 
Morning land 
Evening land 
Policy in Years 1-10 
Default 
Change 
Policy in Years 11+ 
Change 
Default 
If the choice to stick with a default were just like any other 
decision, then this distinction would indeed be merely formal. But a 
great deal of research in political science and psychology suggests that 
the choice to stick with a default is not like other decisions.37 It is, in 
many contexts, no choice at all; it is the absence of a choice.38 Our 
frequently derided "do-nothing Congress," for example, does not "do 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 348 (2011) (summarizing 
research on how departures from defaults tend to be disfavored because they produce 
greater levels of regret and blame than inactive decisions do). 
38 See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 175, 176-77 (2003) (arguing that agents will often "fail(] to choose" for 
themselves, in part because "a change from any status quo entails time and effort, and 
many people seem to prefer to avoid both of these"). 
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nothing" because it finds the status quo ideal-it does nothing 
because it is incapable of actively choosing anything.39 
While it is possible that the legislatures of Morningland and 
Eveningland both earnestly believe that economic conditions favor a 
lower tax rate in the short term and a higher one in the long term, and 
thus both deliberately choose the lower rate for now and the higher 
rate for later, it is also possible that each simply surrenders to the 
forces of inertia for one of those time periods. The difference is that 
Momingland has come to a consensus on future policy that it could 
not reach for the present,40 while Eveningland has come to a 
consensus on present policy that it could not agree to impose on the 
future. 41 
Sunrise and sunset lawmakers thus display very different beliefs 
about how current political choices should affect posterity. Sunset 
clauses reflect epistemological modesty-they allow the present to 
conduct an experiment without presuming that future lawmakers 
should continue it.42 They also force deliberation.43 Alexander 
Hamilton supported the Constitution's two-year military 
appropriations limit because it required the legislature "once at least 
in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a 
military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and 
to declare their sense of the matter," rather than allowing military 
39 See Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary 
Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2217, 2230 (2013) (discussing how an inability to reach 
proactive decisions can cause "[a]rbitrary inaction" in which a legislature sticks to some 
default even though it may not reflect the policy preferences of a majority). Obviously 
there is a distinction between the mechanisms that lead an individual to stick to a default 
in, say, his retirement portfolio allocation, and a legislature to stick to a policy default. But 
in both cases we can say that the ultimate selection does not necessarily reflect either the 
decisionmaker's (or decisionmakers') substantive preferences between outcomes so much 
as a desire to avoid the costs associated with making any active choice. 
40 Not all time delays reflect present-day dissensus. The "gradual rollout" provisions 
that often appear in ordinary legislation probably represent a shared view that piecemeal 
implementation will work best. Many of the central features of the Affordable Care Act, 
for example, did not come into effect until several years after the law was passed for 
logistical reasons. See Key Features of the Affordable Care Act by Year, DEP'T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERvs., http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/timeline/timeline-text.html (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2015). But the most interesting forms of sunrise lawmaking-the ones on 
which this Article focuses its attention-use time delays as a way to accommodate 
disagreement about what to do today. 
41 Sunset clauses are particularly popular in tax legislation, for example, because they 
allow legislators to satisfy "pay as you go" requirements without having to come to long-
term consensus about budget balancing. See Kysar, supra note 31, at 1011-12. 
42 See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 248 (2007) 
(arguing that "temporary legislation" has benefits in "policy contexts dominated by 
uncertainty" because it "facilitate[s] experimentation and adjustment in public policy"). 
43 See Kysar, supra note 31, at 1041-43 (laying out and critiquing this position). 
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expenditures to become entrenched through inaction.44 Thomas 
Jefferson articulated the same principle at a higher level of generality 
when he famously advocated that all laws, including constitutions, 
sunset after nineteen years in order to allow each generational 
majority to construct its own legal regime.45 
Sunrise lawmakers, by contrast, do wish to impose their choices 
on the future-and only on the future. That is the sole point of their 
legislative endeavors. If a sunrise law fails to affect the future-if it is 
repealed before the end of its implementation lag, for example-then 
it accomplishes nothing at all. While sunset laws make it easy for 
future lawmakers to reject a new policy (by requiring them actively to 
renew it if they want to keep it), sunrise laws will only succeed if 
reversing a previous legal enactment is difficult. If legislation can be 
effortlessly repealed, then sunrise lawmaking is a pointless-or at 
least merely hortatory-endeavor. If, on the other hand, inertia or 
supermajority requirements make it exceedingly difficult to undo 
what past legislatures have done, sunrise lawmaking will prove highly 
effective. 
Sunset lawmaking thus reflects the spirit of the ordinary 
democratic process: It enables contemporary majorities to govern 
themselves without simultaneously making rules for the future. 
Sunrise lawmaking, by contrast, reflects the spirit of constitutionalism: 
It enables contemporary majorities to cast their eyes forward and 
think only of the future. 46 As we emphasize, this feature gives it the 
power to reshape constitutional lawmaking-for better or for worse. 
B. Sunrise Amendments as Tools of Constitutional Lawmaking 
Hamilton and Jefferson lauded sunset clauses for promoting dis-
tinctively democratic virtues: deliberation and self-determination. 
Sunrise lawmaking is promising because it can promote a distinctively 
constitutionalist virtue: disinterested consideration of a polity's long-
term needs. 
The desire for constitutional lawmaking to reflect impartial, 
forward-looking thinking has a venerable pedigree. At the Philadel-
phia Convention, James Wilson asked his fellow delegates to "con-
44 THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 129 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 
2008). 
45 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 396 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
46 Constitutional lawmaking is thus particularly amenable to sunrise clauses, whereas 
much ordinary legislation responds to immediate concerns. Compare EL.STER, supra note 
21, at 145 (suggesting that sunrise lawmaking "is utopian and probably undesirable" in the 
many contexts "in which waiting is an unaffordable luxury"), with AMAR, supra note 6, at 
474 (arguing that constitutions are designed to establish enduring rules for the long term). 
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sider that we are providing a Constitution for future generations, and 
not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the moment."47 It was 
clear to him, and to many of his colleagues, that this weighty task 
required a less parochial approach than everyday politics.48 In fact, 
some delegates assumed that, in the heady atmosphere of a constitu-
tional convention, broad-minded thinking would come about of its 
own accord. Gouverneur Morris suggested that adopting a disinter-
ested perspective when making law that would last for centuries was 
not only desirable, but unavoidable. "[A]fter all," he remarked, "how 
little can be the motive yielded by selfishness for such a policy" when 
no one could know for certain what the interests of his children or 
grandchildren would be?49 Speaking in a similar vein, George Mason 
argued that the long time horizon of constitutional law left delegates 
no choice but to "attend to the rights of every class of the people" 
because "however affluent their circumstances, ... the course of a few 
years, not only might but certainly would, distribute their posterity 
throughout the lowest classes of Society."50 As a result of this inevi-
table reshuffling, "[ e ]very selfish motive therefore, every family 
attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would 
provide no less carefully for the rights-and happiness of the lowest 
than of the highest orders of Citizens."51 
Modem scholars often agree that legislators will-or at least 
should-display less partiality when drafting constitutions than when 
passing ordinary legislation.52 Jack Balkin, for example, argues that 
the durability of constitutional law forces 
majorities to think hard about the consequences of what they want 
to do, because they and their descendants will have to live with what 
they put in place for a long time. This keeps majorities from 
focusing on short-term consequences .... It also creates a sort of 
temporal veil of ignorance. It encourages existing majorities to 
imagine themselves as potential minorities in the future.53 
Larry Sager similarly writes that "[d]ecisionmaking about a long-
distance Constitution is a special kind of venture, one which reinforces 
47 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 125 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS]. 
48 See, for example, the statements of James Madison and Alexander Hamilton in 1 
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 20, at 421-24. 
49 Id. at 531. 
50 Id. at 49. 
51 Id. 
52 This premise is a staple of rational choice literature on constitutionalism. See, e.g., 
GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES 28-31 (1985); 
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 25, at 77-80; DENNIS c. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 61-63 (1996). 
53 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 0RIGINALISM 30-31 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
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the tendency to generalize away from one's own time and circum-
stances to other times and other circumstances-potential circum-
stances representing a considerably broader range of values and 
interests. "54 
Yet there may be reasons to doubt constitutional lawmaking's 
power to induce disinterested, universalistic thinking in all cases. 
Constitutional lawmakers are after all usually politicians who must 
answer to the immediate demands of their constituents or risk losing 
their jobs. Jon Elster argues that this produces a constant dilemma: 
"On the one hand, the very nature of a constitution requires 
[lawmakers] to legislate in the interest of all and for the indefinite 
future. On the other hand, they also have short-term and partisan 
motives imposed on them by their constituencies."55 Since there is no 
reason to assume that the first pull will always overpower the second, 
Elster dismisses as mere "cant" the common assumption "that framers 
and politicians differ not only with regard to their respective tasks, but 
also with regard to their motives."56 
The persistence of the undemocratic electoral idiosyncrasies dis-
cussed in the Introduction-the lack of representation for D.C., the 
Electoral College, and the malapportioned Senate-suggests Elster's 
skepticism may be warranted. One could offer principled defenses of 
America's odd elections practices-and some have57-but it seems 
obvious that those who benefit from the current arrangement pose the 
real obstacle to changing it. Reforming our electoral system would 
have predictable, immediate, and negative consequences for identifi-
able groups. The District of Columbia's residents vote overwhelm-
ingly Democratic; granting them congressional representation would 
be tantamount to adding three new members. to the Democratic 
Caucus.58 Switching to a national popular vote would instantly under-
mine the outsize clout wielded by politically divided states in presi-
54 Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893, 951-52 
(1990). 
55 ELSTER, supra note 21, at 144. 
56 Id. at 172. 
57 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Electoral College Reform, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 993 (2001) 
(reviewing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY: THE ELECTORAL 
COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYSTEM (1971); JUDITH BEST, THE CASE 
AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL 
COLLEGE (1975); LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & ALAN G. BRAUN, THE POLITICS OF 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM (1972)) (describing several authors' defenses of the 
Electoral College). 
58 The District has given more than eighty percent of its vote to the Democratic 
candidate in each of the past eight presidential elections. See UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 
SANTA BARBARA, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
showelection.php?year=2012 (last visited Aug. 12, 2015). 
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dential elections.59 And small states are unlikely to be any more 
willing to concede a privileged place in the Senate now than they were 
back in 1787.60 Given the supermajority required for an Article V 
amendment, these opposing forces are more than enough to derail 
attempts at reform-even those with majority support.61 
Sunrise amendments combat the tendency to prioritize parochial 
interests over the general welfare by removing many short-term moti-
vations from the political calculus. If a legislator is asked to support a 
policy that has deleterious short-term effects on his constituents but 
positive long-run effects on the nation, he faces, as Elster notes, a 
dilemma. However, if that same policy has no short-run effects on the 
legislator's constituents-or anyone else for that matter-because it 
does not go into effect for some long period of time, the dilemma 
fades away, freeing the lawmaker to focus on the best overall solu-
tion.62 Sunrise lawmaking's method of building agreement about the 
future while sidestepping disagreement in the present can thus trans-
form constitutional politics under the plausible assumption that indi-
viduals are more responsive to general considerations when making 
law without immediate interests in mind. 
Of course, delayed implementation cannot eradicate all parochial 
concerns from constitutional lawmaking. Many legislators may 
believe-correctly or not-that they can reliably identify how partic-
ular policies will affect their constituents' descendants in the distant 
59 See Nate Silver, Arizona Is (Probably) Not a Swing State, N.Y. T1MEs: 
F1vETtt1RTYE1GHT (Apr. 27, 2012), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/ 
arizona-is-probably-not-a-swing-state/ (discussing the wide disparity in different states' 
likelihood of proving decisive in the presidential election). 
60 The tendency of small-state and large-state representatives to look primarily to the 
short-term interests of their constituents when debating questions of proportional 
representation is one of the oldest features of American constitutionalism. The 
Philadelphia Convention featured considerable division on the question of representation. 
See Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 345, 400-04 (2000). It remains contested whether any change eliminating uniform 
Senate representation would be constitutionally permissible without unanimous support 
given the limitations imposed by Article V. Compare AMAR, supra note 8, at 292-99 
(arguing such a change would be permissible), with John Gardner, Can There Be a Written 
Constitution?, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 162, 182-86 (Leslie Green & 
Brian Leiter eds., 2011) (suggesting it would not). 
61 The supermajority requirement may have become even more restrictive over time as 
the number of U.S. states has increased. See Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional 
Amendments, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643, 653 (2011) ("All else being equal, this change in 
the denominator for Article V has implied a directly proportionate increase in the 
difficulty of ratifying proposed amendments."). 
62 See ELSTER, supra note 21, at 144 (arguing that the power of inlmediate interests is 
attenuated when legislation does not take effect for many years). 
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future.63 Additionally, some lawmakers may be more concerned with 
a proposed measure's expressive meaning than with its practical 
effects-more interested, for example, in what eliminating the 
Electoral College communicates about "New Hampshire" in the 
abstract than in how it affects the well-being of any flesh-and-blood 
Granite Staters, now or in the future. 64 
Yet lawmakers are still unlikely to be as politically constrained by 
distant effects as they are by the immediate need to satisfy their elec-
toral bases. Our pervasive inability to address problems such as cli-
mate change, whose effects are primarily felt in the future, suggests 
that future consequences often count for less in the political calculus.65 
To the extent this is true, a hypothetical New Hampshire legislator 
would have far less difficulty explaining to his constituents why he 
voted to diminish the political power of future generations of Granite 
Staters through a sunrise amendment abolishing the Electoral College 
than he would justifying a vote to eliminate the Electoral College 
today. It is therefore likely that amending the Constitution at a lag 
would help bring about the world that Gouverneur Morris and 
George Mason optimistically assumed we were already living in. 
Lifting many of the pressures of legislating for the present would leave 
constitutional drafters freer to focus on general principles for the 
future. 
Sunrise amendments could thus open up a range of promising 
possibilities.66 Each of the seemingly impossible reforms described in 
the Introduction, for example, might be attained through sunrise law-
making. While it is easy to identify the immediate winners and losers 
63 For example, about half of Americans over seventy-five currently reside in the state 
of their birth, so a representative of a small state might reliably predict that his descendants 
will continue to be benefited by Senate malapportionment. See PING REN, U.S. CENsus 
BUREAU, LIFETIME MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 4 tbl.2 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011 pubs/acsbrl0-07. pdf. 
64 Cf Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REv. 413, 417 
{1999) (arguing that people seek to see their "own distinctive conception of virtue 
authoritatively confirmed" in the law, and their "cultural adversaries' officially 
repudiated"). 
65 Empirical research suggests that we dramatically discount the importance of future 
effects. One study, for example, found that subjects were indifferent between saving one 
person today and forty-five people in 100 years. Maureen L. Cropper et al., Preferences for 
Life Saving Programs: How the Public Discounts Time and Age, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
243, 244 (1994). But see Shane Frederick, Measuring Intergenerational Time Preference: 
Are Future Lives Valued Less?, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 39, 40 (2003) {finding that 
levels of intergenerational time preference vary significantly depending on how the 
questions are presented). 
66 See Foley, supra note 24, at 10-18 {identifying a variety of reforms that could be 
accomplished through delayed amendments, including the elimination of the Electoral 
College, campaign finance reform, and fixed terms for Supreme Court Justices). 
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review 
1990 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1975 
from reforming the Electoral College, the Senate, or D.C.'s congres-
sional representation, the vagaries of political realignments and popu-
lation shifts make it difficult to pin down the future effects of these 
changes.67 It might therefore be possible for reformers to obtain the 
broad-based support required to alter the constitutional specifications 
for elections through sunrise lawmaking. 
In the process, these reformers might also transform our constitu-
tional discourse, creating a political space in which lawmakers could 
work towards shared goals for the future rather than squabble over 
narrow, immediate disputes. Our political culture as a whole-
frequently assailed for being too partisan and polarized68-could reap 
the benefits of this newfound common ground. 
II 
SUNRISE LAWMAKING AND DEMOCRATIC 
CoNSTITUTIONALISM 
The use of sunrise lawmaking to break free from political paral-
ysis holds special promise-and presents a particular puzzle-for 
democratic-constitutionalist accounts that understand the 
Constitution as the institutional realization of popular sovereignty.69 
The promise is that sunrise lawmaking could provide a means for 
67 When California was admitted to the union in 1850, for example, it was the eighth-
smallest state in the country; a century later it was the second largest. U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 
24-39 (1975). 
68 See, e.g., Jill Lepore, Long Division: Measuring the Polarization of American Politics, 
NEw YORKER, Dec. 2, 2013, at 75 (reviewing empirical metrics and popular sentiments); 
House and Senate Polarization 1879-2014, VoTEVIEW (Dec. 22, 2014), http:// 
voteviewblog. word press.com/2014/12/22/house-and-senate-polarization-1879-2014/ (finding 
that both houses of Congress are more polarized than ever before). 
69 There are currently a variety of approaches that go by the name of "democratic" or 
"popular" constitutionalism. In this Article, we explore sunrise lawmaking from a 
democratic-constitutionalist perspective that conceives the Constitution as the framework 
for direct popular rule on matters of fundamental law. Popular constitutionalism 
emphasizes the ways in which constitutional interpretation takes place outside the 
judiciary, including by politicians and social movement leaders. See, e.g., LARRY D. 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REv1Ew 8 (2004) (defining popular constitutionalism); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: 
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192 (2008) 
(arguing that Heller relied on an alleged originalism that reflected "popular 
constitutionalism" of the late twentieth century); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, 
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 
CALIF. L. REv. 1323, 1328-29 (2006) (examining the role that social movements and 
nonjudicial conflicts of constitutional vision have in changing constitutional law). We agree 
with Rebecca Zietlow that popular and democratic constitutionalism are often left 
undistinguished in these discussions, though we adopt a different conception of democratic 
constitutionalism than she does. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the 
Affordable Care Act, 72 Omo ST. L.J. 1367, 1371 (2011). 
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achieving fundamental democratic reforms to the present constitu-
tional order that would otherwise be unattainable.7° In this regard, 
sunrise lawmaking might help to realize the implicit democratic poten-
tial of the U.S. Constitution. The puzzle concerns the legitimacy of 
sunrise amendments passed by one generation exclusively for another. 
The temporal delay that makes sunrise lawmaking work also poses in 
the starkest terms the longstanding tension between democratic rule 
and constitutionalism. The counter-majoritarian difficulty71 that 
attends constitutionalism is at once the constitutive condition of sun-
rise lawmaking's efficacy and a threat to the ideal of self-rule empha-
sized in the democratic-constitutionalist account. 
This Part seeks to resolve the paradox of sunrise lawmaking. It 
argues that, if properly directed, sunrise lawmaking could prove an 
important technique for constitutional reform that works through, 
rather than outside, Article V. Sunrise lawmaking thus offers the pos-
sibility of renewing the democratic Constitution that many scholars 
and activists see as lost. Meanwhile, concerns about the intertemporal 
legitimacy of sunrise lawmaking can be addressed by restricting it to 
what we call "democracy-enhancing" measures that use this technique 
only in the furtherance of future generations' capacity for self-
government. 
In Part II.A, we discuss what it means to have a democratic-
constitutionalist understanding of the American political tradition. We 
examine the background political theory that suggested the revolu-
tionary possibility of popular sovereignty under modern conditions 
and then how the founding generation operationalized this theory. 
Part 11.B catalogs the current loss of faith in the democratic character 
of the American constitutional order, and a corresponding increase of 
interest in informal and even nonconstitutional projects of democratic 
renewal. Part 11.C explores sunrise lawmaking as a technique that 
might ameliorate the tension between constitutionalism and democ-
racy by reclaiming the formal constitutional amendment process and 
directing it towards fundamental democratic reform. But it also high-
lights the way in which sunrise lawmaking may, through its temporal 
separation of ruler and ruled, violate the principle of self-legislation 
that is central to democratic-constitutionalist accounts of political 
autonomy. Part 11.D introduces our solution to this problem, <level-
70 Akhil Amar, for example, has proposed using sunrise lawmaking to realize more 
fully the democratic potentiality of U.S. political practice. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 
474-77. 
71 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962) (offering a canonical presentation 
of the "counter-majoritarian difficulty"). 
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oping a taxonomy of ways in which sunrise lawmaking may prove 
"democracy enhancing" or "democracy restricting" according to the 
principle that when one generation rules for another, it must confer 
upon the future the possibility of more effective self-rule. 
A. Popular Sovereignty and Democratic Constitutionalism 
In its paradigmatic form, democratic constitutionalism views a 
constitution as an institutional vehicle for foundational or funda-
mental legislation by the people directly.72 In this framing, the 
opening declaration of agency in the Preamble-"We the People"-
provides, at a high level of abstraction, the beginning and end of 
modern constitutional theory and practice.73 Constitutionalism in the 
United States can be understood as the realization of a popular polit-
ical agency whose purpose-"a more perfect Union"-comes 
prefigured in the plural noun by whose authority the Constitution was 
first "ordain[ed] and establish[ed]."74 
The preeminent exponent of this position, Akhil Amar, has 
adopted a democratic interpretation of the Constitution as an admit-
tedly imperfect but nevertheless extraordinarily innovative experi-
ment in popular sovereignty.75 While conceding that the document fell 
short of its aspiration to majoritarian democracy in several notable 
ways-owing largely to its complicated hybrid character as both a 
treaty among (state) sovereigns and the constitution of an emergent 
(national) sovereign76-Amar takes the ideal of democratic sover-
72 We take this viewpoint to be a plausible interpretive lens through which to view the 
aim and history of the U.S. Constitution, and we examine its limitations below. We 
recognize that there are a variety of other approaches to democratic constitutionalism. See, 
e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE 
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25, 27-28 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (offering 
a definition of democratic constitutionalism centered on the tension between the legal 
legitimacy of the constitution as our "fundamental law" and the demand that it be 
"democratically responsive"). 
73 Several important works of constitutional law scholarship have focused on this 
opening declaration. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Popular Sovereignty and the United States 
Constitution: Tensions in the Ackermanian Program, 123 YALE L.J. 2644, 2658, 2664 
(2014). 
74 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
75 See AMAR, supra note 8, at 5-53 (arguing that the Federal Constitution 
institutionalized popular sovereignty in the United States); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent 
of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 457 
(2004) [hereinafter Amar, Consent of the Governed] (same); Akhil Reed Amar, 
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Anicle V, 55 U. CH1. L. REv. 
1043 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia Revisited] (same); Akhil Reed Amar, Of 
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987) (same). 
76 This perspective leads Amar to a position that several Federalist theorists advanced 
relatively soon after the Founding, which is that the hybrid character of the Federal 
Constitution-in different respects both a "national" constitution and a "federal" one-
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eignty as a normative and interpretive lodestar, and views the history 
of American constitutionalism as the progressive realization of this 
implicit orientation and latent potentiality. It might be said, on this 
view, that the United States is teleologically democratic: It is con-
stantly evolving to become the democracy its constitution prefigures 
and is premised upon. 
Amar and other legal scholars expounding this position do not 
generally turn in detail to the European political-theoretic backdrop 
that enabled the Founders to engage in such a revolutionary articula-
tion of a constitutionally agential people. However, to develop the 
theory of democratic constitutionalism, it is helpful to articulate the 
theoretical problem to which the U.S. Constitution may be under-
stood as a practical solution. The problem was how to achieve popular 
sovereignty-the political constitution of a people-in a large state 
with a territorially dispersed population. Up to roughly the time of the 
English Civil War, the prevailing view was that the conditions of social 
life in the kingdoms of Europe made democratic self-rule impossible; 
the politics that medieval and early-modern Europeans read about in 
chronicles of the ancient city-states reflected a practice no longer 
attainable.77 Central to this understanding was the idea that "the 
people" would have to be physically present-assembled together-in 
order to legislate for themselves. The difficulty of performing this 
maneuver anywhere other than in a few city-states of the Italian 
Peninsula meant that even the most radical medieval political theo-
rists pursued theories of representation of one sort or another.78 Direct 
took on a resolutely "national" character through its national ratification. Note that a 
"national" constitution was assumed, as Madison explained in Federalist 39, to be the 
product of a nationwide majoritarian sovereign. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 193, 199 
(James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001). While this position 
remains contentious, it operates to make the Federal Constitution conform more precisely 
to the sovereignty/government distinction standing behind theories of modern democracy. 
See AMAR, supra note 8, at 292-99; RICHARD TucK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE 
INVENTION OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 121-80 (forthcoming 2016). 
77 While it was often suggested that the hereditary monarchy represented the entire 
nation (including the people), even Aristotelians such as Marsilius of Padua, who were 
drawn to republican ideals, ultimately proposed legislative assemblies composed of 
representatives elected by the people. See MARSILI US OF p ADUA, THE DEFENDER OF THE 
PEACE 79-80 {Annabel Brett ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (1324); TucK, 
supra note 76, at 49-56 (discussing medieval theories of representation). 
78 That said, these medieval theories of representation may have been thought 
contingent on an ultimate residuum of popular authority. See HwA-YONG LEE, POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES: MARSILIUS IN CONTEXT 154-56 (2008) 
(exploring Marsilius's theory of representation and contrasting it with modern accounts). 
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democracy of the Athenian or Roman kind79 was nowhere seen as 
logistically possible, whatever its other merits or demerits. 
How, then, did popular sovereignty come to be a concept that the 
revolutionary generation of Americans could hope to operationalize? 
In a series of lectures and a forthcoming book, Richard Tuck, a histo-
rian of political thought, traces the genesis of the revolutionary idea of 
popular sovereignty back to a crucial distinction between "sover-
eignty" and "government" that grounded the theoretical justification 
of the early modern state.80 The distinction, ironically enough, first 
appeared in the work of Jean Bodin, who used it to defend the monar-
chical sovereignty of late-sixteenth-century France.81 In articulating 
the foundational concept of "sovereignty," Bodin distinguished it 
from "government" or "administration." The will of the sovereign was 
the ultimate source of all law and could be kept functionally distinct 
from the ongoing administrative operations that the sovereign might 
authorize.82 This sovereignty/government distinction later found a 
central place in the work of the great English philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes,83 who inaugurated the social contract tradition out of which 
modern constitutionalism emerges.s4 
79 For an authoritative account of Athenian democracy, see MoGENS HERMAN 
HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES (J.A. Crook trans., 
Univ. of Okla. Press 1999) (1991). On Rome, see FERGUS MILLAR, THE CROWD IN ROME 
IN THE LATE REPUBLIC 209 (1998) (defining the Roman Republic as a "direct 
democracy"). For the influence of Rome on later political theory, see FERGUS MILLAR, 
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC IN POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002). 
80 Richard Tuck's forthcoming book, The Sleeping Sovereign, is based on his Seeley 
Lectures at Cambridge University in 2012. It is not primarily an intervention in modern 
constitutional theory, but a history of the political theory of the modern state from its 
conception in early modern Europe through to the late eighteenth-century revolutions in 
the United States and France. See TucK, supra note 76. 
81 For Bodin's foundational account of sovereignty, see JEAN BODIN, METHOD FOR THE 
EASY COMPREHENSION OF HISTORY 172-73, 178 (Beatrice Reynolds trans., W.W. Norton 
& Co. 1969) (1566), and JEAN BODIN, LEs Six L1vRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE 122-61 
(Barthelemy Vincent 1593) (1576), translated in JEAN BODIN, THE Six BooKES OF A 
CoMMONWEALE 84-113 (Richard Knolles trans., Impensis G. Bishop 1606). See also TucK, 
supra note 76, at 9-30. 
82 Although Bodin argued for the sovereignty of the monarch, a major purpose of his 
theory was to defend a governmental role for the regional parlements-with which he was 
himself associated-as important instruments of government in the large French kingdom. 
Id. at 36-37. 
83 The metaphor of the "sleeping sovereign," which provides the title of Tuck's lectures 
and book, is found in Hobbes's philosophical masterwork, De Cive, where he used the 
Bodinian theory of sovereignty in constructing his theory of the social contract. Indeed, 
Hobbes explicitly acknowledged his debt to Bodin's theory of sovereignty in the 
unpublished English-language version of De Cive, The Elements of Law. THOMAS HOBBES, 
THE ELEMENTS OF LAW NATURAL AND PoLmC 139-40 (1640). 
84 This theory was relied on and reworked by a host of later figures, including Samuel 
Pufendorf, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant-and provided the 
political theory underlying the American and French revolutions. On the relation of 
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At the base of this tradition is the idea of the sovereign as the 
ultimate legal authority for a society. While Bodin and Hobbes both 
gave reasons to favor monarchical sovereignty, they recognized that 
sovereignty (and government) could take any of the forms familiar 
from ancient political thought-rule by one (monarchy), rule by a few 
(aristocracy), or rule by the many (democracy).85 Strikingly, Hobbes 
argued that the initial constitution of sovereignty is necessarily demo-
cratic: All states must pass through an initial phase of democracy, 
understood as universal assent to majoritarian decision making, 
before they can become aristocracies or monarchies through the 
transfer of sovereignty from the ruling majority to a smaller group.86 
Precisely how to interpret this important claim remains a point of con-
tention in political theory,87 but for our purposes what matters is that 
the founding theorist of the social contract tradition tied the modern 
theory of sovereignty to democracy. In so doing, Hobbes inaugurated 
a line of thinking that ultimately led to the explicitly democratic polit-
ical theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau88 and the experiments with pop-
ular sovereignty proposed by the American and French 
revolutionaries.89 
Hobbes to these later figures, see RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF w AR AND PEACE: 
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 140-225 
(2001 ed. 1999). 
85 More precisely, they both avoided typologizing these in "good" and "bad" forms-
e.g., monarchy as legitimate rule by one, tyranny as illegitimate rule by "one"-as 
Aristotle had suggested in his Politics, owing, at least in Hobbes's case, to a refusal to 
imagine that "good" and "bad" are given by nature outside the political order. This refusal 
is central to Hobbes's construction of the state of nature. See THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE 
CITIZEN 55, 70-71 (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne eds. & trans., 1998) (1642); see 
also David Singh Grewal, The Domestic Analogy Revisited: Hobbes on International 
Order, 125 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 18-22) (on file with authors) 
(discussing Hobbes's account of the democratic origins of the "well-ordered 
commonwealth"). 
86 See HOBBES, supra note 85, at 94-95. 
87 Compare Kinch Hoekstra, A Lion in the House: Hobbes and Democracy, in 
RETHINKING THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 191 (Annabel Brett & 
James Tully eds., 2006) (arguing against a democratic interpretation of Hobbesian political 
theory), with Richard Tuck, Hobbes and Democracy, in RETHINKING THE FouNDATIONS 
OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra, at 172 (arguing that "Hobbes's contribution to 
democratic theory ... [is] perhaps one of his most important legacies"). 
88 By the time that Rousseau penned his famous Social Contract, the sovereignty/ 
government distinction was clear enough that he devoted the central chapter in the book to 
considering how the people, as sovereign, could keep control of the "government" they 
would need to bring into being, so as to avoid its "usurpation" of their democratic 
sovereignty. See JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAU, Of the Social Contract or Principles of Political 
Right, in THE SocIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 39, 82-120 
(Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., 1997). 
89 See TucK, supra note 76, at 143-61, 189-205 (detailing its use among the American 
revolutionaries). 
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Sovereignty, in this account, had to be undivided in order to be 
capable of lawmaking, but the sovereign need not produce all relevant 
law itself. Only fundamental law had to be issued by the sovereign, 
who could authorize others (the "government" or "administration") 
to make lesser rules on its behalf. The sovereignty/government distinc-
tion thus turns on what Tuck describes as "an institutional division 
between constitutional and other kinds of legislation."90 In spite of its 
monarchical pedigree, this idea was used to overcome the standard 
objection to modern democracy-that it would prove impossible for 
large, territorially dispersed populations to govern themselves.91 For, 
if sovereignty need concern itself only with fundamental laws, then 
"the people" could hold sovereignty, provided that one of their 
founding acts was to constitute a "government" to manage day-to-day 
affairs in their place (which would be subject to episodic correction as 
required). Under this conception, the only reasons to be against 
democracy were the usual demophobic ones familiar since Plato's 
attack on Athenian democracy.92 The overriding logistical difficulties 
that had seemed earlier to settle the question, regardless of one's view 
of the people's moral or intellectual capacity for self-rule, were no 
longer dispositive.93 
This theoretical innovation made democracy in modern times 
seem newly possible, and questions about its appropriate institutional-
ization began to be debated in the late-eighteenth century, particu-
larly once the American and French revolutionary regimes wrote 
constitutions lodging sovereignty in the people.94 Broadly, the sover-
90 Id. at 250. This familiar feature of modem states was arguably unknown in antiquity, 
when sovereign and governmental functions were undistinguished and usually performed 
by the same legislator (e.g., a citizen assembly or monarchical regime). 
91 Indeed, some of Bodin's earliest readers noted that his theory could be used to 
justify modem democracy. Id. at 44. That Hobbes later predicated the social contract on an 
initial democratic self-constitution made the connection between democracy and modem 
sovereignty all the clearer. See id. at 99-100. 
92 These include not only conventional demophobic arguments about the ignorance or 
unruly passions of ordinary people, but also a high-theoretical argument that the 
determination of justice was necessarily a matter for elite philosophical investigation and 
thus inaccessible to ordinary citizens. See Daniela Cammack, Plato and Athenian Justice, 
36 HlsT. PoL. THOUGHT (forthcoming Winter 2015). 
93 Demophobic arguments charge ordinary people with fecklessness, insufficient 
wisdom or expertise, unruly passions, and other debilities. Akhil Amar does an admirable 
job cataloguing-and rebutting-these standard anti-democratic objections in the context 
of the modem debate. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 75, at 1096-1102. 
94 Written constitutions of the familiar modem kind-enactments of a separate, 
foundational legislator-first began to be drafted and ratified in the individual states of the 
United States in the mid-1770s, followed about a decade later by the U.S. Constitution and 
the various constitutions of revolutionary France. The sovereignty/government distinction 
was central to these political projects, although realized differently across them. See TucK, 
supra note 76, at 149--61, 183-84, 189-212. 
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eignty/government distinction allowed for the conceptualization of the 
constitution as the direct promulgation by the sovereign people of 
their fundamental law, including laws framing the foundation and 
operation of the government, which represents the people but should 
not be conflated with the sovereign. This institutional division 
between direct democracy at the level of sovereignty and representa-
tion at the level of government means that the source of constitutional 
authority in a modern democracy-the people-will often be asleep 
(to use Hobbes's metaphor)95 for long spells punctuated by bouts of 
constitutional lawmaking when it awakes. Governmental activity 
authorized by the people proceeds in the interim.96 
While this institutional division of political labor seems obvious 
to us now, it was a strange innovation at the time.97 What it enabled, 
however, was nothing less than the project of modern constitution-
alism, including democratic constitutionalism. For while the possibility 
of a continuously assembled and self-governing people had indeed 
vanished with antiquity, popular sovereignty was nevertheless still 
achievable in modern times.98 But it required an institutional vehicle 
for its realization-and the revolutionary regimes in the United States 
and (soon after) France99 made the first attempts to initiate new 
democracies of this distinctively modern form. 
95 See HoBBES, supra note 85, at 99-100 (describing the original metaphor of the 
sleeping sovereign). 
96 As the social contract theorists discussed in this Section clearly recognized, a 
government constituted by the sovereign people need not be organized democratically. 
The examples of an elected monarch or a dictator on whom the people devolve emergency 
powers reveal instances in which democratic sovereignty authorizes monarchical 
government. Their anxiety was that the (continuously assembled) government would usurp 
the prerogatives of the (intermittently assembled) sovereign. One difficulty in guarding 
against such usurpation is distinguishing "fundamental" from routine legislation, given that 
the spectrum of rulemaking runs the gamut from local traffic ordinances to annual national 
budgeting. For further discussion of the character of the government in modern 
constitutional democracies, including our defense of democracy-enhancing reforms at the 
governmental level, see infra Part 11.D. 
97 In spite of the fact that monarchs do, of course, sleep-and that viziers and other 
administrators must govern in their place during that time-Tuck explains that the idea 
"that the sovereign legislator has an institutional shape but is usually dormant" was odd 
enough that it "proved ... hard to imagine prior to the eighteenth century, and prior to a 
proper understanding of the distinction" between sovereignty and government. TucK, 
supra note 76, at 252. 
98 As Tuck explains, "the appearance of a clear conceptual distinction between 
sovereignty and government was a necessary precondition for the emergence of a 
distinctively modern idea of democracy, in which the mass of the citizens could genuinely 
participate in politics as long as their participation was limited to a set of fundamental acts 
of legislation." Id. at 249. 
99 Tuck notes that "something like a modern plebiscitary system was a natural 
extension of Rousseau's ideas, and the implications were duly drawn once the French 
Revolution began." Id. at 144-45. The recent experience of the United States also loomed 
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review 
1998 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1975 
B. Constitutional Change Outside Article V 
It is not entirely clear how and why the idea of democratic consti-
tutionalism, as outlined above, was gradually lost from American 
political self-understanding. One major reason may be that using 
Article V in the twentieth century has proved far more difficult than 
anyone could have anticipated in 1787, when the country had only 
thirteen states and an undeveloped party structure.100 As late as the 
Progressive Era, major political reforms were carried out through 
formal amendments to the constitutional text with the passage of the 
Sixteenth through Nineteenth Amendments.101 After that, however, 
although the People roused themselves in 1933 to abolish 
Prohibition102-dramatically, the only instance of amendment 
through state conventions, rather than legislatures103-most major 
political changes of the mid-twentieth century were achieved through 
the ordinary legislative process. This is not to say that the results of 
these legislative episodes were in any way ordinary,104 but rather that 
these political reforms did not principally employ Article V proce-
dures to change the constitutional text. The New Deal was an 
intragovemmental initiative that produced no alterations to the con-
stitutional text.105 The Civil Rights era did see at least one constitu-
tional amendment-the abolition of the poll tax106-and, arguably, 
several related electoral reforms.107 However, the most significant dis-
mantling of racial apartheid was accomplished outside the formal 
amendment process, through landmark statutes (such as the Civil 
large among the leading Girondins: Jean-Pierre Brissot and the Marquis de Condorcet, for 
example, were both inspired by the radical state constitutions of revolutionary America, 
which they viewed as allowing plebiscitary control of fundamental law. Id. at 145-51. 
100 For a discussion of the declining use of Article V, and whether it should accordingly 
be understood as in constitutional desuetude, see Albert, supra note 26. For an argument 
concerning the "irrelevance" of constitutional amendments, given their infrequency, and 
the priority of informal mechanisms of constitutional change, see David A. Strauss, The 
Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1457 (2001). 
101 See U.S. CONST. amends. XVI-XIX. 
102 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXL 
103 Ratification in the first place was done through state conventions. See AMAR, supra 
note 8, at 308-09. Repeal of prohibition is the only other unmediated act of sovereignty 
since the Founding. 
104 The results of these extraordinary legislative episodes have been analyzed as "super-
statutes." See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 
1215 (2001) (distinguishing ordinary legislation from "super-statutes" that "penetrate 
deeply into American norms or institutional practice"). 
105 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 314-15 (1998) 
(explaining the Supreme Court reversal that accommodated Roosevelt's legislative agenda, 
thus legitimating the New Deal without any Article V amendments). 
106 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
107 See AMAR, supra note 8, at 438-47 (characterizing other amendments, such as the 
Twenty-Third and Twenty-Sixth, as stemming from the mobilization of the civil rights era). 
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Rights Act of 1964) and Supreme Court decisions (from Shelley v. 
Kraemer through Brown, Bailey, and Loving). The cumulative effect 
has been to push scholars and political activists to focus on democratic 
change outside the formal constitutional amendment process.108 
The leading figure in the legal scholarship on constitutional 
change outside Article V has been Bruce Ackerman, whose multi-
volume We the People series proposes a theory of constitutional 
change that supplements the "classic" route to constitutional amend-
ment (via Article V) with a "modem" route that proceeds through 
"constitutional moments."109 After the founding generation, 
Ackerman explains, the success of Reconstruction Republicans, New 
Deal Democrats, and civil rights activists required "adapting the para-
digms of popular sovereignty inherited from the eighteenth cen-
tury"110 by looking outside "the formula for formal amendment laid 
out by the Founders in Article V-under which Congress proposes, 
and state legislatures ratify, changes in our higher law."111 Ackerman 
advances a theory of popular sovereignty expressed outside the 
Article V process through governmental action: A new constitutional 
settlement is recognized when, "over time, all three branches repeat-
edly endorse the legitimacy of the breakthroughs that initiated the 
new regime. "112 
108 The question of what is in or outside the formal process is itself open to scholarly 
dispute. See Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change (or, How Many 
Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A)< 26; (B) 26; (C) > 26; (D) 
All of the Above), 8 CONST. COMMENT. 409 (1991). For an account sympathetic to informal 
mechanisms of constitutional change, see DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 
(2010). For an account that argues for the exclusivity of the Article V amendment process, 
see David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 
76 low A L. REv. 1 (1990). For a typology of informal amendment, see Albert, supra note 
26, at 1060-71. 
109 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (beginning his 
multivolume history of "constitutional moments" and the "modern" route to constitutional 
change outside Article V); ACKERMAN, supra note 105 (continuing this history, including a 
discussion of constitutional change in the New Deal); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: THE ClvIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, THE ClvIL 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION] (focusing on constitutional change in the Civil Rights era); see also 
Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989); 
Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 
(1984). 
110 ACKERMAN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 109, at 3. 
111 Id. For more on Ackerman's idea of "higher lawmaking," see Bruce Ackerman, 
Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING ·TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 63 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
112 ACKERMAN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 109, at 4. 
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Ackerman is motivated to consider constitutional change outside 
Article V by the difficulty of using textually indicated mechanisms.113 
And his work has led a generation of like-minded scholars to consider 
non-Article V routes of constitutional change.114 His influence is vis-
ible in recent discussions of democraticl15 and popular116 constitution-
alism, as well as in the bourgeoning interest in both landmark 
legislative enactments117 and the effects of social movements and pop-
ular activism on constitutional law.118 In a similar vein, Akhil Amar 
has suggested that a national plebiscite could legally ratify a proposed 
amendment without going through the Article V process.119 Sanford 
Levinson, a critic of the current constitutional order, agrees, and has 
also proposed a new constitutional convention to address the 
Constitution's many undemocratic features. 120 His calls are echoed by 
Larry Lessig121 and certain segments of the political right.122 
113 See id. at 3 ("[T]he great political movements of the past have often displayed far 
more creativity in gaining popular consent to their new constitutional settlements."). 
114 See Levinson, supra note 108, at 429 ("The most significant alternative, from the 
perspective of the traditional lawyer, concerns the relative displacement of Article Vas the 
mechanism by which amendments occur."). For criticisms, see, for example, Michael J. 
Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's 
Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992). 
115 For a democratic-constitutionalist discussion and critique of Ackerman's theory, see 
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 75, at 1090-96. 
116 See KRAMER, supra note 69, at 197-98 (discussing and criticizing Ackerman's idea of 
"higher" lawmaking from the standpoint of a more populist reading of the constitution). 
117 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: 
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 61-65 (2010). 
118 For examples of recent work on social movements and legal change, see Jack M. 
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 
927 (2006) (outlining how political contestation over the meaning of principles and 
practices alters legal meaning); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the 
Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1436 (2005) (considering 
affirmative action in the context of social movements and constitutional culture); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. 
L. REv. 419 (2001) (studying how social movements based on identity claims have changed 
twentieth-century legal culture); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based 
Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 
(2002) (same). 
119 See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 75; Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, 
supra note 75 (arguing that Article Vis a nonexclusive means of constitutional change and 
that ordinary majoritarian processes supplement it). 
120 LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 177-78 (calling for a new constitutional convention and 
endorsing Amar's view of constitutional popular sovereignty). 
121 Larry Lessig is now leading a campaign to address the problem of money in politics 
through mass political action with the aim of initiating constitutional change. The problem 
of money in politics would seem the perfect issue for constitutional amendment since the 
government (including not just the representative branches, but also the judiciary) must 
otherwise be trusted to police itself. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LosT: How 
MONEY CoRRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 293-94 (2011) for Lessig's call for 
a new constitutional convention; and Evan Osnos, Embrace the Irony, NEw YORKER, Oct. 
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Other scholars have turned away from the constitutional text 
altogether, emphasizing the ways in which popular movements alter 
the shared social meanings that underlie constitutional interpretation. 
For example, Larry Kramer's seminal work on "popular constitution-
alism,"123 which promotes the view that constitutional change emerges 
from popular forces, has spilled over into research on "dialogic" 
models of constitutionalism124 that emphasize how social movements 
influence constitutional lawmaking.12s 
What unites these otherwise disparate approaches is a desire to 
escape the confines of Article V. This academic trend is reflected in 
the efforts of real-world reformers, who have similarly grown exasper-
ated with the difficulty of enacting fundamental change through the 
formal amendment process. Several of the most promising contempo-
rary movements for constitutional reform seek to employ non-Article 
V means.126 The National Popular Vote initiative, for example, aims to 
have the President elected by popular vote-but through an interstate 
contract, rather than a constitutional amendment.127 It is thus striking 
13, 2014, at 52, 58-63, for a description of Lessig's multi-faceted campaign. On corruption 
in American politics and its relation to democracy, see ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION 
IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S SNUFF Box To CITIZENS UNITED (2014); 
Zephyr Teachout, Neoliberal Political Law, 77 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., no. 4, 2014, at 
215. 
122 See State-Led Push to Force Convention to Amend Constitution Gains Steam, with 
High-Profile Republican Support, Fox NEws (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/po 
litics/2015/02/15/state-effort-to-pass-constitutional-amendments-rein-in-washington-gets/. 
123 KRAMER, supra note 69; Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 
CALIF. L. REv. 959 (2004). For a discussion of Kramer's theories and proposal for their 
expansion, see Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 Wis. L. REV. 
159. For a critical review, see Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? 
Constitutionalism? 118 HARV. L. REv. 1594 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)). 
124 See Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
991, 997-1005 (2006) (analyzing popular constitutionalism as a dialogue between courts 
and popular renderings of constitutional principle). 
125 See sources cited supra note 118. 
126 Meanwhile, even reform movements that do attempt to utilize Article V 
mechanisms-like those of Larry Lessig or some right-wing activists, see supra notes 
121-22-have grown exasperated with the traditional, congressionally initiated process 
that has produced the existing twenty-seven constitutional amendments. 
127 The initiative asks states to adopt legislation pledging their electors to the winner of 
the popular vote, provided that enough other states agree to do likewise. Once states 
representing 270 electoral votes have opted in, the contract goes into effect, and the winner 
of the popular vote will effectively become the winner of the Electoral College. So far, 
eleven jurisdictions together representing 165 electoral votes-61 % of the necessary 
total-have agreed to the plan, making it far more likely to succeed than any of the 
attempted constitutional reforms of the presidential election mechanism that have 
foundered in the House and Senate over the years. See NAT'L POPULAR VoTE, http:// 
www.nationalpopularvote.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). For an analysis and defense of 
the National Popular Vote Compact, see Vikram David Amar, Response, The Case for 
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how far Americans-constitutional scholars and political activists 
alike-still understand themselves as a constituted people, yet have 
lost confidence in the textually prescribed mechanism for constitu-
tional change. 
C. The Promise and Peril of Sunrise Lawmaking 
Sunrise lawmaking holds out the hope of realizing the vision of 
democratic constitutionalism by breaking the political paralysis that 
has caused reformers to abandon Article V. It does so through a new 
solution to an old problem. 
As James Madison observed in Federalist 10, democratic politics 
can be crippled by lawmakers' narrow focus on personal agendas. 
"[A] body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same 
time," but in any democratic legislature, "the parties are, and must be, 
themselves the judges."128 Legislators have "interests" affected by the 
legislation they pass, and those interests will "certainly bias [their] 
judgment."129 Therefore, "[i]t is in vain to say that enlightened 
statesmen" will pursue the "public good."130 Instead, divergent inter-
ests will lead to "faction" and self-serving behavior.131 Madison 
believed that since the causes of faction were intrinsic to the demo-
cratic process, the only thing to do was to control faction's effects by 
entering into a large, diffuse union in which condensed agglomera-
tions of interest would be difficult to assemble and maintain.132 
Today's political stalemate suggests that our modern national 
republic fails to dampen the effects of faction in this manner. But sun-
rise lawmaking allows us to revisit Madison's premise about faction's 
causes. When legislators pass ordinary laws, these laws inevitably 
affect the legislators' interests, creating the bias of which Madison 
warned. But when they pass laws for the future, the connection is 
more attenuated. A legislator making law for the distant future looks 
through a blurry lens-she cannot reliably know what policies will 
advance her own interests, or those of her descendants, many years 
down the road (nor is it obvious that she will care much about the 
particularized fate of individuals so far away).133 Perhaps, then, it is 
Reforming Presidential Elections by Subconstitutional Means: The Electoral College, the 
National Popular Vote Compact, and Congressional Power, 100 GEO. L.J. 237 (2011). 
128 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 46-47 (James Madison) (Justin McCarthy et al. eds., 
1901). 
129 Id. at 46. 
130 Id. at 47. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 47. 
133 Of course, a legislator might still care about the interests of her descendants or other 
particular future individuals and act on the basis of these parochial interests when crafting 
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not "in vain" to hope that "enlightened statesmen" will pursue the 
"public good" when they engage in sunrise lawmaking-and therefore 
that sunrise lawmaking could break the political deadlock that other-
wise stands in the way of reform. 
There is an obvious affinity between this idea and the political 
theory of John Rawls, who famously attempted to discover the princi-
ples of justice by examining the decisions individuals would make 
when choosing fundamental rules for a society without any knowledge 
of their place in it.134 Rawls argued that the ignorance imposed by this 
"original position" would ensure that "any principles agreed to will be 
just."135 Behind what he called a "veil of ignorance," individuals 
would not know "how the various alternatives will affect their own 
particular case ... [and would thus] evaluate principles solely on the 
basis of general considerations," according to a "fair procedure."136 
Perhaps, similarly, a legislature passing laws for the future, but not the 
present, would be able to conceive of itself as "We the People," rather 
than a collection of diverse and clashing interests, and behave in an 
accordingly enlightened manner. Akhil Amar has noted precisely this 
possibility, expressing hope that legislators crafting sunrise amend-
ments would behave roughly as would individuals in Rawls's "original 
position," engaging in disinterested, broad-minded thinking.137 If he is 
right, then sunrise lawmaking could offer a solution to Madison's 
dilemma-and, in so doing, renew the project of democratic constitu-
tionalism through the formal amendment process. 
Yet there are important differences between the original position 
envisioned by Rawls and the real-world circumstances of sunrise 
lawmakers-differences that threaten to betray, rather than advance, 
the democratic-constitutionalist vision. The hypothetical denizens of 
Rawls's original position do not create rules for any society; they 
create rules for their society. This is a crucial feature of the thought 
experiment: We can have faith in the decisions that emerge from the 
original position only because its inhabitants "must choose principles 
sunrise amendments. But as we argue in Part LB, concerns for future individuals are likely 
to be weak compared to concerns for present-day ones. See supra notes 62-65 and 
accompanying text. 
134 See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusncE (1971). 
135 Id. at 136. 
136 Id. at 136-37. 
137 AMAR, supra note 6, at 475. Amar is not alone in his desire to cast constitutional 
lawmaking in Rawlsian terms-several scholars have embraced the idea that constitutional 
drafters' inability to know how the law they produce will affect their own interests should 
place them in something approximating the original position. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 
53, at 30-31; ELSTER, supra note 21, at 144. 
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the consequences of which they are prepared to live with."13B The 
drafters of sunrise amendments, by contrast, never have to accept the 
consequences of the principles they choose. They legislate for others, 
not for themselves. 
This difference removes one of the most robust safeguards on the 
legislative process: the requirement that "the democratic majority ... 
accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you 
and me."139 In most lawmaking, including constitutional lawmaking, 
legislators must live under the laws they pass. The American founding 
generation, for example, created a constitution not just for posterity, 
but also for itself. Many of the Framers at Philadelphia went on to 
staff the government they designed in the summer of 1787.140 Sunrise 
amendment drafters, by contrast, may experience none of the effects 
of their handiwork. In fact, given a long enough lag between ratifica-
tion and implementation, every member of an electorate that adopts a 
sunrise amendment may be dead before it becomes law. 
The democratic deficit that afflicts sunrise lawmaking is thus dis-
tinct from-and more worrisome than-the general puzzle concerning 
the democratic legitimacy of constitutional law.141 Though regular 
constitutional enactments usually affect future generations that are 
not present to vote on them, they also affect the current electorate, 
which provides a kind of virtual representation for the future.142 For 
example, almost no women alive today were around to advocate for 
the Nineteenth Amendment, which guaranteed female suffrage,143 but 
their great-grandmothers were instrumental in securing reform, for 
both themselves and posterity.144 And no present-day voter cam-
paigned for the right to directly elect his Senators,145 but Progressive-
138 RAWLS, supra note 134, at 137 (emphasis added). 
139 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
140 See AMAR, supra note 8, at 208 (recounting how Philadelphia Framers held three of 
the first six Supreme Court seats, eleven of the twenty-two original Senate seats, eight of 
the initial fifty-nine House seats, two of the first five Cabinet positions, and, of course, the 
first presidency). 
141 For a lucid account of this deficit, and a response that emphasizes the interrelation of 
freedom and self-constraint across time, see JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A 
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001). 
142 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Neo-Federalism?, in CoNSTITUTIONALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 153, 187 (Jon Elster & 
Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (discussing how constitutional enactments emerge from a 
process of democratic deliberation in which a contemporary majority decides to adopt 
them). 
143 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIX. 
144 See AMAR, supra note 8, at 424. Several anti-suffrage politicians were ultimately 
punished by electorates that included women, such as Senator Atlee Pomerene of Ohio 
and Senator James Wolcott Wadsworth, Jr. of New York. Id. at 424 n.45. 
145 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
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era popular mobilization did.146 Whether this virtual representation 
provides an adequate solution to the counter-majoritarian difficulty 
that attends constitutional law is not our present concern;147 the point 
is instead that sunrise amendments often entail the complete absence 
of even this kind of accountability. 
Sunrise lawmaking thus presents in starkest terms the familiar 
tensions at the heart of democratic constitutionalism, which stem from 
its two seemingly contradictory purposes.148 Democratic government, 
under Alexander Bickel's famous formulation, does not require that 
the will of the people be instantly reflected in law, but it does require 
that "a representative majority has the power to accomplish a 
reversal. "149 Constitutionalism, on the other hand, at least in a domi-
nant twentieth-century framing, deliberately sets out to "withdraw 
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities."150 This counter-majoritarian 
difficulty quickly metastasizes into an intertemporal one because, 
while it would be one thing for contemporary majorities to place cer-
tain options out of their own reach, in fact, they are foreclosing 
options for their descendants. "[T]o the extent that [constitutional 
provisions] ever represented the 'voice of the people,'" John Hart Ely 
observes, they "represent the voice of people who have been dead for 
a century or two. "151 
As David Hume noted two and a half centuries ago, this type of 
intergenerational lawmaking "supposes the consent of the fathers to 
bind the children, even to the most remote generations (which repub-
146 See AMAR, supra note 8, at 410-12 (describing the state-by-state effort). 
147 Of course, if constitutional decisionmaking mechanisms were fully democratic, then 
even this minimal "virtual" representation would not really be needed, since the future 
could simply reject the rules made by the past. 
148 See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) {discussing the tensions between 
constitutionalism and democratic autonomy); see also THE PARADOX OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM (Martin 
Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007) (presenting a collection of essays on the political 
theory of constitutionalism, including the tension between popular constituent power and 
constitutional discipline). 
149 BICKEL, supra note 71, at 17. The point can and should be extended beyond 
specifically representative government, which was Bickel's concern, to majorities in 
plebiscitary democracy or to referenda. 
150 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). Note that this is a 
framing that conceives the constitution as a check on democracy rather than its realization. 
151 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11 
{1980). 
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lican writers will never allow)."152 Indeed, some early republican 
writers, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, explicitly dismissed all 
attempts at intergenerational binding as "absurd."153 This kind of con-
stitutional binding subjects living majorities to "the dead hand of the 
past," a possibility against which Thomas Jefferson famously recoiled, 
arguing that, "the earth belongs to the living, and not to the dead. "154 
The intertemporal challenge facing defenders of sunrise amend-
ments is even more daunting. Insofar as the present generation stands 
on shaky ground when it tries to bind subsequent generations, its 
footing appears particularly precarious when it also refuses to bind 
itself. By doing so, it seems to say to posterity, "This change, which 
was not good enough for us, we deem to be good enough for you." 
The drafters of sunrise amendments may not just be fathers binding 
their sons, as David Hume argued, but also hypocrites who refuse to 
live under the arrangements they set up for the future. 155 And even if 
their intentions are unimpeachable, they are still accountable to no 
one actually affected by their handiwork. This sits awkwardly with the 
democratic principle that all interested parties should have the chance 
to participate in decisions that affect them.156 
152 DAVID HuME, Of the Original Contract, in EssAYs: MoRAL, POLITICAL AND 
LITERARY 452, 457 (Oxford Univ. Press 1963) (1741 & 1742). 
153 RoussEAU, supra note 88, at 111-12; see also id. at 57 (criticizing intergenerational 
binding). 
154 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 45; see also THOMAS 
PAINE, The Rights of Man, in The Life and Major Writings of Thomas Paine 243, 254 
(Philip S. Foner ed., 1961) (arguing that the only true consent of the governed is "the 
consent of the living"). Jefferson's views were influenced by those of the Marquis de 
Condorcet, who expressed anxiety about intergenerational binding in a pamphlet 
published a month earlier, during the debates over French constitutional ratification in 
August of 1789. Condorcet even went so far as to calculate, on the basis of mortality tables, 
how often law should turn over for there to remain a living majority that had ratified it. 
MARQUIS DE CoNDORCET, On the Need for Citizens to Ratify the Constitution (1789), 
reprinted in CONDORCET: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL THEORY 271, 
272 (Iain McLean & Fiona Hewitt eds., 1994). 
155 Sunrise lawmakers are like the ministers ("fathers" of a different kind) in Nathaniel 
Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter, or James Baldwin's Go Tell It on the Mountain, who 
demand fidelity of their followers but practice adultery themselves. And just as these 
unfaithful men of God lack the moral authority to tell their congregants to stay true to 
their spouses, so too might the creators of sunrise amendments lack the legitimacy to bind 
future generations if they cannot abide by the results of their own binding. 
156 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) ("In the 
legislature of the Union alone, are all represented. The legislature of the Union alone, 
therefore, can be trusted by the people with the power of controlling measures which 
concern all, in the confidence that it will not be abused."). 
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D. Democracy-Enhancing and Democracy-Restricting Sunrises 
The essence of democratic constitutionalism is that the sovereign 
people author their fundamental law. The promise of sunrise law-
making is that it may provide an Article V route to reinvigorate dem-
ocratic constitutionalism in the United States. However, it does so 
through a technique that may impede the sovereignty of future major-
ities in a way that is even more pronounced than in regular constitu-
tional lawmaking, since the sunrise legislator is not bound by the laws 
she passes for posterity. Sunrise lawmaking thus lacks the form of 
accountability that is embedded in democratic sovereignty understood 
as a discipline of self-rule-that the legislator, too, is bound by the 
laws. 
In this Section, we propose a solution to this dilemma by identi-
fying those forms of sunrise lawmaking that are "democracy 
enhancing"-and thus compatible with democratic constitution-
alism-and those that are "democracy undermining," and therefore 
incompatible with it, whatever their other merits may be. Our argu-
ment, in brief, is that where one generation legislates exclusively for 
another, all it can legitimately legislate is the autonomy of the 
future-that is, the capacity of later generations to live under laws of 
their own choosing. 
Our claim rests on extending to the body politic across genera-
tions Kantian and neo-Kantian claims concerning autonomy and the 
proper limits of guardianship among individuals. In his famous essay, 
What Is Enlightenment?, Kant conceives of "enlightenment" as the 
gradual attainment of autonomy via the overcoming of "self-incurred" 
immaturity.157 But when immaturity is not the self-incurred condition 
of someone who ought to be autonomous, but of someone who cannot 
be-for example, a child or student-Kant emphasizes the primary 
responsibility of a guardian or tutor to help the immature individual 
develop the powers of a mature, autonomous person. In the neo-
Kantian analysis offered by John Rawls, these principles justify pater-
nalism towards people who lack control of their rational faculties-
children, the injured, and the mentally ill.158 In such cases, paternalism 
157 IMMANUEL KANT, AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: 'WHAT Is ENLIGHTENMENT?', 4 
Berlinische Monatsschrift 481 (1784) (emphasis added), reprinted in KANT, POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 54, 54 (Hans Reiss ed., 1991) (1970). "Immaturity," per Kant, "is the inability to 
use one's own understanding without the guidance of another." Enlightenment requires 
conquering the root causes of this immaturity-the "[l]aziness and cowardice" of those 
who refuse to use their own reason, as well as the manipulations of the self-appointed 
"guardians" of the people, who warn of the many dangers of enlightenment. Id. at 54. 
158 Rawls explains, "For these cases the parties adopt principles stipulating when others 
are authorized to act in their behalf and to override their present wishes if necessary; and 
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may be justified, Rawls notes, "by the evident failure or absence of 
reason and will," but "it must be guided by the principles of justice 
and what is known about the subject's more permanent aims and pref-
erences, or by the account of primary goods."159 In other words, we 
may act on behalf of others when their rationality fails them or is 
undeveloped, but we must do so in their best interest, by pursuing the 
ends they have (rationally) chosen previously or-absent information 
on what those are-adopting rational ends that would be suitable for 
any person, such as pursuing "primary goods" useful for any life. 
How would this principle apply, not to persons unable to act 
autonomously because they lack rational faculties, but to our political 
posterity? It would require recognizing an analogy between individual 
and political autonomy, and then attempting to realize the latter 
through constitutional mechanisms of popular sovereignty. Legislation 
for the other must respect the other's autonomy, if only in potentia. 
Thus, all the present can legislate specifically for the future, consistent 
with respect for the autonomy of future democratic majorities, is the 
capacity to legislate.160 Where the legislator is intended to be a demo-
cratic majority-as the sovereign people are understood to be in dem-
ocratic constitutionalism-a sunrise amendment is legitimate only 
when it increases the democratic character of political decision 
making in the future.161 
Defining such a "democracy-enhancing" sunrise amendment 
requires specifying a theory of democracy. Since we are discussing 
constitutional lawmaking in a dualist system, it also requires clarifying 
how democracy may be manifested at the level of sovereignty and at 
the level of the government. To consider sovereignty first, we follow 
the line of the democratic constitutionalists surveyed above in empha-
sizing that what constitutions allow, at least as an ideal, is majoritarian 
decision making in a plebiscitary (i.e., direct or unmediated) fashion-
this they do recognizing that sometimes their capacity to act rationally for their good may 
fail, or be lacking altogether." RAWLS, supra note 134, at 249. 
159 Id. at 250. 
160 This normative orientation is similar in some respects to Amar's argument that 
sunrise amendments should be used to secure "fair decisional procedures" for the future. 
He writes: "If ever there were a proper role for the 'dead hand of the past'-the fixing of 
certain ground rules by Generation 1 for the benefit of Generation 2-it is in the setting of 
fair decisional procedures, precisely because Generation 2 cannot easily do this for itself." 
AMAR, supra note 6, at 474. 
161 Paradoxically, sunrise lawmaking that enhances democracy can also undermine the 
conditions of its own efficacy: In a perfectly democratic order, the will of the current 
majority would determine fundamental issues, and democracy-enhancing sunrise 
amendments would be unnecessary. Indeed, it is only where democracy can be enhanced 
that sunrise amendments would actually work, since they can only bind a future generation 
if constitutional authority limits ordinary majoritarian democracy. 
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as occurred in the American ratification experience and would occur 
in a new national constitutional convention.162 Such direct democ-
racy-if instituted properly-rests on the ideal of "one person, one 
vote," and any reform that moves the constitutional order in that 
direction thus proves "democracy enhancing." 
Where the legislation is less fundamental, and can be left to the 
government that the sovereign constitutes, the question of how to 
judge its democratic character becomes admittedly more difficult, as 
does the question of whether democracy-enhancing reforms necessa-
rily imply democratic governmental procedures.163 At the most basic 
level, democratic constitutionalism requires the government that the 
·sovereign people constitute to remain their instrument while per-
forming its designated tasks, and not to usurp the powers of the sover-
eign. Reforms that reinforce governmental accountability to the 
people as a whole thus enhance democracy. Such reforms may include 
commitments to governmental transparency and ex post auditing of 
governmental officials, which allow the sovereign to judge govern-
mental fidelity to the tasks it has authorized. 
A more complex matter is whether reforms that bring the govern-
ment closer to the ideal of "one person, one vote" with respect to the 
representation of citizens across the political branches are also to be 
deemed "democracy enhancing." Under a system of perfected demo-
cratic sovereignty-that is, where national majorities could straight-
forwardly authorize any desired constitutional changes, including to 
the structure and function of the governments they constitute-the 
democratic character of the government would prove a secondary 
question. A democratic sovereign might create a variety of 
nondemocratic governmental structures to serve its purposes.164 
Under some circumstances, it is even possible that a distribution of 
governmental representation that was not democratic-that is, which 
deviated from the principle of "one person, one vote" in the selection 
162 See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 75. 
163 The social contract theorists who distinguished sovereignty/government did so with 
the understanding that the two could take different forms. See supra note 89 and 
accompanying text. Their main concern was to avoid governmental usurpation of sovereign 
prerogative-which would, via the accepted impossibility of organizing directly democratic 
government on ancient lines, make democracy impossible once again under modem 
conditions. The durable separation of sovereignty and government is thus the functional 
prerequisite of modern democracy. 
164 A temporary executive for emergency conditions, elite deliberative bodies, and 
courts provide historical examples of nondemocratic governmental bodies authorized by 
democratic decision making at the sovereign level. For a discussion of the theorization of 
these bodies in terms of the sovereignty/government distinction, see supra notes 89-95 and 
accompanying text. 
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of representative bodies-might nevertheless prove "democracy 
enhancing" at the level of sovereignty.16s 
However, given the present difficulties in the United States of 
using either textually indicated constitutional mechanisms or an 
extraordinary national convention to reconstitute the government and 
put it more directly under the control of the sovereign majority, a 
great deal of the lawmaking performed by Congress, the Executive, 
and the Courts must substitute for what, under other arrangements, 
would be sovereign decision making performed by the people collec-
tively. For these reasons, we include as democracy-enhancing reforms 
not only those that work to recalibrate the sovereign-government rela-
tion (so that the latter is more clearly realized as a construction of the 
former), but also those that democratize the government in its opera-
tion.166 Thus, any reforms that either push the relevant form of consti-
tutional decision making closer to a "one person, one vote" model, or 
165 For example, where entrenched inequalities distort the democratic character of the 
sovereign by allowing for systematic exclusion of some individuals from decision making 
based on racial, gender, or class lines, remedies might include overrepresentation of 
excluded groups at the level of government, in order to redress these inequalities and 
enable the construction of a properly democratic sovereign. From a democratic-
constitutionalist perspective, this argument is perhaps the most persuasive reason to 
deviate from the straightforward argument that governmental representation should be 
"one person, one vote," which is the form we endorse in our definition of democracy-
enhancing reforms. Note that any such system of minority overrepresentation would need 
to be authorized by the national majority if it is to be understood as contributing to, rather 
than undermining, the underlying institution of popular sovereignty. This basic analysis 
similarly holds true for alternative electoral systems that aim to instantiate differently the 
principle of "one person, one vote," for example, proportional representation and other 
schemes that promote inclusion of minority political parties. 
166 In this sense, our conception of "democracy" across both government and 
sovereignty combines, to use a classical lexicon, a democratic (i.e., majoritarian) sovereign 
and an aristocratic (i.e., elected) government. It thus corresponds to Rousseau's 
recommendation in Book III of The Social Contract, and reflects what we take to be a 
rather widespread view of modern "democracy," in which sovereignty is exercised by the 
people directly, if episodically, and representatives, who are meant to be chosen in a 
manner reflecting the equal right of each member of the electorate to representation, 
receive ordinary legislative powers. See, RoussEAU, supra note 88, at 111-12. The obvious• 
puzzle here, which we cannot explore in detail, concerns the character of appointed 
governmental officials, including the federal judiciary. It is relatively clear what sort of 
reforms would make the political branches of government more democratic: Most would 
address the unevenness of representation across the citizen body, in the manner we 
exemplified in the Introduction. However, the ideal of "one person, one vote" has no 
obvious purview when it comes to evaluating the democratic character of the judiciary. Cf 
B1cKEL, supra note 71, at 18 (observing that judicial review is a "deviant institution in the 
American democracy"). We must thus assume for present purposes that the constitutional 
creation of life-tenured and federally appointed judges satisfies an important, if 
nondemocratic, governmental function, as willed ultimately by the democratic sovereign, as 
noted supra notes 154 and 156. 
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increase the accountability of the constituted government to the sov-
ereign people, enhance democracy in our view.167 
By contrast, there are two ways in which a sunrise amendment 
might prove democracy restricting. The first occurs when one genera-
tion is openly exploitative of another; the second when it pursues a 
misguided, even if genuine, desire to determine the laws for another 
(but not for itself). Each has an analogue in the Kantian conception of 
guardianship. The exploitation of the ward by the guardian obviously 
undercuts the conditions under which the ward may grow to attain 
autonomy. Likewise, even well-intentioned but substantive direction 
of the ward-for example, prescribing a particular direction for the 
development of the ward's talents or personality-will favor some 
paths and foreclose others, undermining the ward's capacity to 
become an equal agent in time. 
To return to the context of lawmaking by one generation for 
another, consider one vivid example of open exploitation through sun-
rise lawmaking. Advocacy groups have tried for decades to pass a 
"balanced budget amendment" that would constitutionally require the 
United States government to spend no more than it takes in each 
year.168 Various proposals of this sort have garnered considerable sup-
port on multiple occasions. Just three years ago, a balanced budget 
amendment received 261 votes in the House of Representatives and 
47 in the Senate.169 In 1995, a similar measure came within a single 
vote of securing the required two-thirds majority in both Houses of 
Congress, obtaining 300 votes in the House and 65 in the Senate.17° 
The 1995 initiative ultimately fell short over concerns that it would 
167 As should be obvious, in a great many cases the question as to whether a particular 
governmental arrangement enhances democratic control will be contentious, perhaps 
particularly in relation to how elections should be managed in terms of funding, candidate-
selection, and access to media. Our argument that sunrise lawmaking should be restricted 
to democracy-enhancing measures is not meant to downplay the difficulty of identifying 
them, particularly where there is a genuine disagreement over how.best to ensure popular 
control of the government. 
168 For an example of current balanced budget advocacy, see AMERICANS FOR A 
BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT, http://www.balanceourbudget.com (last visited Oct. 20, 
2015). 
169 For the Senate vote, see U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 112th Congress - 1st Session 
(2011 ), U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/vote_menu_ll2_ 
1.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). For the House, see Final Vote Results for Roll Call 858, 
OFF. OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/ 
2011/roll858.xml (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). 
170 After the amendment fell one vote shy of the required 67 in the Senate, Majority 
Leader Bob Dole switched his vote in order to enable himself to reintroduce the measure 
later, bringing the final tally to 65-35. See Edwin Chen & Michael Ross, Balanced-Budget 
Amendment Falls Short in Tight Senate Vote, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 3, 1995), http://articles. 
latimes.com/1995-03-03/news/mn-38285_1_balanced-budget-amendment. 
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review 
2012 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1975 
siphon money away from the Social Security trust fund-a highly 
salient political issue for the large segment of the electorate in or 
approaching retirement.171 Suppose, in order to assuage these constit-
uents' fears, the supporters of constitutionalized balanced budgets 
turned their proposal into a sunrise amendment that would only go 
into effect in 2115. This might make the idea more palatable to 
present-day voters, none of whom would have to worry about seeing 
their Social Security checks vanish as a result of constitutionally man-
dated belt-tightening.172 In fact, the sunrise solution would even 
appeal to spendthrift voters. By promising to be frugal later, and 
embedding that promise in the Constitution, the current generation 
could reassure lenders of the United States' ability to repay its debts 
in the future, and thereby guarantee its own ability to engage in ram-
pant borrowing in the present.173 
Whether or not it is advisable to require balanced budgets in the 
Constitution, using a sunrise amendment to do so in this manner feels 
highly questionable. The generation that produces such an amend-
ment does not simply "enable" its descendants to live within their 
means; it also takes advantage of the frugality it imposes on the future 
in order to live an extravagant lifestyle in the present.174 This use of 
the Constitution to enrich one generation at the expense of another 
raises many of the intergenerational equity concerns that pepper dis-
cussions of the national debt175 or climate change.176 Indeed, it magni-
fies them by ossifying the present generation's self-serving decision to 
live off the backs of its successors through constitutionalization. 
171 See Michael Wines, Senate Rejects Amendment on Balancing the Budget; Close Vote 
ls Blow to G.O.P. (Mar. 3, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/03/us/104th-congress-
balanced-budget-senate-rejects-amendment-balancing-budget-close.html. 
172 Indeed, some economists have explicitly suggested that this type of delayed 
implementation provision is the best way to achieve balanced budgets. See Guido Tabellini 
& Alberto Alesina, Voting on the Budget Deficit, 80 AM. EcoN. REv. 37 (1990), reprinted 
in 2 MONETARY AND FISCAL Poucy: PouT1cs 157, 171 (Torsten Persson & Guido 
Tabellini eds., 1994). 
173 A similar argument is often offered for freeing central banks from political control. 
A country with an independent central bank makes a credible commitment to sound 
monetary policy in the future, making lenders more likely to trust it. Otherwise, potential 
creditors may worry that the government will inflate away its debts in order to satisfy its 
present political objectives, leaving future generations to deal with the fallout. See ALEX 
CUKIERMAN, CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDENCE 349-50 
(1992). 
174 The literary example for this type of "father" would be Mr. Brocklehurst, the stingy 
schoolmaster in Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre, who preaches an ethic of poverty and 
subjects the children in his care to extreme privation, all in order to stuff his own pockets 
and live a lavish lifestyle. 
175 See, e.g., James C. Clingermayer, An Intergenerational Transfer Model of State Debt 
Financing, 72 Pus. CHOICE 13, 13 (1991) (discussing public debt as an intergenerational 
transfer of tax obligations). 
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Sunrise amendments can also be democracy restricting even if 
they do not openly attempt to exploit future generations in this 
manner. Suppose well-meaning reformers proposed an amendment 
that increased the voting age to thirty, and that went into effect thirty 
years after ratification so that no one currently alive would be 
affected. That (admittedly unlikely) sunrise amendment would have a 
much greater chance of success than a comparable amendment that 
took effect immediately, since it would have no direct adverse impact 
on the eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old constituents who would 
otherwise vote against their own disenfranchisement.177 Even if the 
proponents of such a change thought they were acting generously on 
behalf of the future-delivering it an older, wiser electorate-their 
behavior could hardly be understood as that of a sovereign consti-
tuting itself through fundamental law. Instead, these sunrise 
lawmakers remove future individuals from the sphere of political par-
ticipation but face no present-day accountability for their actions. 
They have failed to serve as proper guardians for future majorities by 
denying them, through a sunrise, their political autonomy.178 
III 
SUNRISE LAWMAKING IN THE CONSTITUTION 
Our taxonomy of sunrise lawmaking provides a framework in 
which to examine the use of time delays in the United States 
Constitution. Several important constitutional provisions kept some, 
or all, of their effects from being felt at the moment of their adoption. 
Understanding these provisions as instances of sunrise lawmaking 
helps us appreciate both the text and history of the Constitution, and 
the practice of sunrise lawmaking itself. Of course, the identification 
of these time delays as "sunrise amendments" is a retrospective con-
ceptual classification with normative intent: Our purpose is not simply 
to record the examples of temporal delays in prior constitutional law-
176 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz & Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate Change and Future 
Generations, 84 S. CAL L. REv. 1097, 1100 (2011) (arguing that climate change models 
should place a greater weight on the interests of future generations). 
177 Some younger voters might even favor the sunrise proposal, which would have the 
effect of increasing their power by creating a smaller electorate once they were in it. 
178 The problem of misguided paternalism is obviously most acute when sunrise 
lawmakers fail to recognize their own limitations and presume to be able to know the 
needs of future generations. However, even if they were to "get it right" and deliver to a 
future electorate a precisely desired result, the action would still violate the autonomy of 
the future-the need for each generation to understand itself as the author of its own law. 
This violation of autonomy may be understood with reference to Amartya Sen's distinction 
between "culmination outcomes," which specify only an end result, and "comprehensive 
outcomes," which also include the way in which that result was achieved (i.e., the decision 
process as well as the decision). See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JusncE 215 (2009). 
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making, but to bring these into self-conscious recognition as examples 
of a technique that might be used for future democratic renewal. 
This Part both provides an overview of temporal delays in the 
Constitution and evaluates them from the normative standpoint of the 
democracy-enhancing analysis we developed above. We find that in 
several instances, constitutional lawmakers used time delays to 
achieve otherwise unrealizable reforms that brought political practice 
closer to the constitutional ideal declared in the Preamble: the unified 
popular legislator envisioned by the plural, first-personal pronoun 
"We." Yet in at least one notable counterexample, sunrise lawmaking 
enabled constitutional drafters to constrain their progeny in mis-
guided ways inconsistent with the tenets of democratic 
constitutionalism. 
A. Gradual Ro/lout: The Eighteenth Amendment 
The Eighteenth Amendment, which brought about the advent of 
prohibition, is arguably the purest formal example of a sunrise amend-
ment in the Constitution: The Amendment's first section specifies that 
its operative provisions will not have the force of law until "one year 
from the ratification of this article. "179 Yet the Eighteenth 
Amendment is functionally distinct from the sunrise amendments on 
which this Article focuses. Those amendments use time as a tool to 
change the balance of present interests in favor or against a proposed 
reform, while the Eighteenth Amendment used time to smooth the 
transition to prohibition. One could imagine a prohibition amendment 
that acted as a sunrise amendment by, for example, delaying the 
alcohol ban for several decades in order to placate powerful brewers 
who were concerned with immediate profits but indifferent to the fate 
of the industry after they were gone. However, the actual prohibition 
amendment adopted such a short implementation lag-just one 
year-that it seems unlikely that its purpose was to induce long-run 
thinking. Rather, the Eighteenth Amendment's one-year delay was 
merely a means to ensure an orderly logistical transition from one 
state of affairs to another. Henry Cohn and Ethan Davis report that 
the lag was inserted to give the brewing industry time to liquidate its 
operations before the ban went into effect.180 The Eighteenth 
Amendment therefore had more in common with the delayed rollouts 
179 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1. 
180 Henry S. Cohn & Ethan Davis, Stopping the Wind That Blows and the Rivers That 
· Run: Connecticut and Rhode Island Reject the Prohibition Amendment, 27 Qu1NNIPIAC L. 
REV. 327, 336 n.55 (2009) (citing THOMAS R. PEGRAM, BATTLING DEMON RuM: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR A DRY AMERICA, 1800-1933 (1998)). 
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that characterize many new statutory initiatives181 than with the kind 
of sunrise lawmaking that could reshape constitutional politics. 
B. Democracy-Enhancing Sunrise: The Slave Importation Clause 
and Amendments Twenty, Twenty-Two, and Twenty-Seven 
On several other occasions, however, constitutional drafters uti-
lized the power of time to enact democracy-enhancing reforms 
without provoking immediate interests that might otherwise have 
mobilized against them. These instances provide prime examples of 
the promise of sunrise lawmaking. 
1. Imposing a Veil of Ignorance on Congress: The Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment 
The Twenty-Seventh Amendment is not itself a sunrise amend-
ment, but it utilizes the principles of sunrise lawmaking to achieve 
democracy-enhancing ends.182 The Amendment restricts Congress's 
ability to vote itself pay raises, providing that "[n]o law, varying the 
compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, 
shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have inter-
vened. "183 It thereby forces legislators to make all congressional pay 
statutes sunrise laws, just as the Army Clause forces legislators to 
include sunset provisions in all military appropriations.184 In so doing, 
it places congressmen behind a veil of ignorance when they vote on 
pay measures.185 Because of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, a 
Congressman deciding whether to support a pay increase does not 
know whether he will still be a Congressman-or just an ordinary tax-
payer footing the bill-when the proposed pay hike takes effect. As a 
result, he is encouraged to adopt a broad perspective on the measure's 
advisability rather than promote his narrow pecuniary interests. The 
181 Many of the central features of the Affordable Care Act, for example, did not come 
into effect until several years after the law was passed. See Key Features of the Affordable 
Care Act by Year, supra note 40. Such "delayed commencement" is a familiar feature of 
much legislation, and is distinct from sunrise lawmaking because it is part of a present-
oriented (not future) initiative in which time delays are imposed for logistical reasons. For 
an analysis of timing rules in constitutional and statutory provisions, see Jacob E. Gersen & 
Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REv. 543 (2007). 
182 For more on the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, and other constitutional provisions 
that require Congress to operate behind veils of ignorance, see Vermeule, supra note 25. 
183 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXVII. 
184 Id. art. I, § 8. 
185 Vermeule, supra note 25, at 421 ("The delay prevents legislators from benefiting· 
during the interim period, and thus ensures that legislators will not consider the question of 
appropriate pay under the distorting influence of short-term personal interest."). 
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overall effect is to increase the public's ability to hold accountable 
politicians who seek to enrich themselves from the public fisc. 186 
2. Political Reforms that Exempt Incumbents: Amendments Twenty 
and Twenty-Two 
Several other constitutional provisions provide even clearer 
examples of the power of sunrise lawmaking to enhance the demo-
cratic character of American government. Amendments Twenty and 
Twenty-Two, for instance, both combat political entrenchment, the 
former by shortening the period in which politicians rejected at the 
polls may continue to govern, and the latter by keeping the presidency 
from taking on the monarchical trappings that so many feared it 
would.187 Both also smoothed the path for these reforms by ensuring 
that they did not affect individuals in office at the time of their ratifi-
cation. This maneuver helped reorient both Amendments away from 
considerations of short-run political tactics and towards long-run con-
siderations about the ideal structure of American democracy. 
The Twentieth Amendment, which dramatically shortened the 
"lame duck" period following congressional and presidential elec-
tions, delayed the effects of its two most important operative sections 
to "the 15th day of October following the ratification of this 
article. "188 This seemingly trivial proviso, which ultimately postponed 
the Amendment's operation by less than nine months, was in fact 
quite significant in historical context. In the presidential election of 
1932, during the depths of the Great Depression, the Democrat 
Franklin Roosevelt resoundingly defeated the Republican Herbert 
Hoover. However, because of the peculiarities of the old constitu-
tional elections calendar, Hoover's administration stayed in power 
until March 1933. The Twentieth Amendment's ratification in the 
early days of 1933 moved the inauguration date to January 20 so that 
no future electorate would have to wait so long to see its President-
elect assume office.189 But since the Amendment stipulated that it 
would not take effect until October 15, Roosevelt did not enter the 
White House a minute sooner than he would otherwise have.190 
186 See 1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 440 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (recounting Madison's 
explanation to the First Congress that the Amendment was designed to avoid the 
"impropriety" of legislators "put[ ting] their hand into the public coffers, to take out money 
to put in their pockets"). 
187 See Donald L. Robinson, The Inventors of the Presidency, 13 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. 
Q. 8, 9-12 (1983) (describing the anxieties many Framers had about a strong executive). 
188 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 5. 
189 AMAR, supra note 8, at 428. 
190 Seventeen states did ratify the Amendment before October 15, 1932. But a 
substantial majority of the forty-eight states that ultimately gave their consent did not do 
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review 
December 2015] MAKE ME DEMOCRATIC, BUT NOT YET 2017 
Without Section 5's delay provision, the Amendment could have been 
read as a gambit to end Hoover's term immediately. The delay's inclu-
sion therefore transformed what might have been, if only in public 
perception, a partisan maneuver to oust a defeated President-against 
the wishes of his remaining supporters-into a decision about the 
long-run benefits of a new election transition mechanism. The 
Twentieth Amendment's drafters, in other words, ensured a more 
democratically accountable government for their progeny by delaying 
the effects of their reforms. 
Similarly, the creators of the Twenty-Second Amendment, which 
established term limits for the presidency, used a grandfather clause to 
defuse some of the controversy the measure's partisan provenance 
inspired and to emphasize instead its long-run democracy-enhancing 
effects. In 1940 and 1944, the Republican Party made presidential 
term limits a key component of its platform, expressing its outrage 
over Roosevelt's decision to run for a third, and then a fourth, term.191 
Anger translated into action in 1947-several years after Roosevelt's 
death-when the Republican-controlled House Judiciary Committee 
reported a proposed amendment limiting the President to two four-
year terms.192 In light of the widespread perception that the measure 
was intended as a posthumous rebuke to Roosevelt and his party, the 
House Judiciary Committee's Report went to great lengths to empha-
size that this was "not a political question," arguing that "[t)he impor-
tance of the problem to the people transcends all political implications 
and considerations. "193 House Democrats were unconvinced. The res-
olution ultimately passed the chamber with the support of all 238 of its 
Republican members, but just 47 of its 168 Democrats.194 
The House's bill was easily characterized as a partisan ploy 
because it struck not only at dead, but also living, Democrats: It con-
tained no grandfather clause, and therefore would have barred 
Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, from seeking a third term.195 In 
the Senate, however, cooler heads prevailed and fashioned a compro-
mise that gave the proposed amendment a more general character. A 
new draft by Republican Senator Robert Taft and his Democratic col-
so until early 1933, at which point they knew that the Amendment would not take effect 
until the following fall. See Ratification of Constitutional Amendments, U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, http://www.usconstitution.net/constamrat.html (last modified Nov. 11, 
2010). 
191 AMAR, supra note 8, at 437. 
192 Stephen W. Stathis, The Twenty-Second Amendment: A Practical Remedy or Partisan 
Maneuver?, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 61, 66 (1990). 
193 H.R. REP. No. 80-17, at 2 (1947). 
194 Stathis, supra note 192, at 67. 
195 See H.R.J. Res. 27, 80th Cong. (as passed by House, Feb. 6, 1947). 
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league Millard Tydings inserted additional language ensuring that the 
measure would "not apply to any person now holding the office of 
President. "196 
The change did not succeed in removing all partisan tint from the 
proposal. The Senate's vote on the compromise amendment was still 
largely divided along party lines,197 and subsequent state ratification 
votes followed a similar pattern.198 Yet exempting the sitting 
Democratic President from the Amendment had significant symbolic 
meaning.199 In the midst of partisan debate, it lent credence to the 
claim that presidential term limits really were an idea that tran-
scended "all political implications and considerations. "200 
The Twenty-Second Amendment's history also provides an inter-
esting example of how time delays require a constitutional change's 
proponents to think beyond their short-term interests. As a result of 
the grandfather clause, the first President actually barred from a third 
term was the Republican Dwight Eisenhower, who left office with 
high approval ratings and would have been a viable third-term candi-
date.201 Therefore, regardless of what the predominantly Republican 
voters who adopted the Twenty-Second Amendment thought they 
were doing, what they ultimately passed was not, in practice, an effec-
tive tactic for short-term political gain. They ensured instead that pres-
idents elected by future electorates-Democratic or Republican-
would not start to resemble kings. 
3. The Full (and Wasted) Potential of Sunrise: The Slave 
Importation Clause 
The Twentieth and Twenty-Second Amendments may appear to 
be marginal instances of sunrise lawmaking because their time lags 
were so short. Article I, Section 9's twenty-year ban on congressional 
interference ,with the slave trade, on the other hand, clearly showcases 
the power of sunrise amendments to effect revolutionary, democracy-
enhancing changes in American society in an intergenerational 
196 Paul G. Willis & George L. Willis, The Politics of the Twenty-Second Amendment, 5 
W. POL. Q. 469, 474 n.24 (1952). 
197 Stathis, supra note 192, at 68. 
198 Id. at 70. 
199 Truman apparently said little throughout the ratification debates, even though he 
later expressed public opposition to presidential term limits. See id. at 71, 75. 
200 H.R. REP. No. 80-17, at 2 (1947). 
201 See Presidential Approval Ratings-Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/l l 6677 /presidential-approval-ra tings-gallup-historical-statistics-
trends.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). The post-WWII President with the second-highest 
approval rating ever at the end of his second term-Ronald Reagan-was also a 
Republican, though his age might have prevented him from running for a third term. 
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fashion.202 As such, it forces us to consider whether a different sunrise 
amendment could have done even more to combat the evils of slavery. 
Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 states: "The migration or importa-
tion of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think 
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the 
year one thousand eight hundred and eight .... "203 This extraordinary 
protection for the international slave trade appears at first glance to 
be a sunset, rather than a sunrise, provision. The Clause's placement 
in Article I, Section 9, which imposes a variety of checks on congres-
sional authority, suggests that it establishes a limit on Congress's ple-
nary power to regulate foreign commerce that sunsets in 1808,204 
rather than establishing a new power to ban the slave trade that sun-
rises at that point. But this analysis misunderstands the baseline from 
which the Framers were operating. The Constitution was adopted as a 
unified whole, rather than piecemeal. Therefore, the relevant 
"default" was not a regime in which Congress could wield its Foreign 
Commerce Clause powers without limits, but the world of the Articles 
of Confederation, in which no present or future national authority had 
the power to ban slave importation.205 Taken as a whole, the 
Constitution created a previously unavailable power-a national legis-
lature that could end the slave trade-but it only allowed that power 
to "sunrise" twenty years after ratification. 
Our characterization of this sunrise as democracy enhancing may 
not seem obvious for two reasons. First, the abolition of the slave 
trade is not linked straightforwardly to improving the mechanisms of 
democratic government for future generations. On its face, the Slave 
Importation Clause appears instead to impose a substantive policy 
decision on the future-that the federal government should have 
expansive powers over foreign commerce-and therefore to engage in 
misguided paternalism ("misguided" here referring not to the choice 
to hinder the slave trade, but rather to do so through sunrise instead 
of ordinary lawmaking). Yet closer inspection reveals that the Slave 
Importation Clause was indeed democracy enhancing. The institution 
of chattel slavery stands in dramatic opposition to the "one person, 
202 According to Jefferson's own calculations, using contemporary life tables, each 
governing majority lasted about nineteen years. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
James Madison, supra note 45, at 394. This means that the effect of the slave importation 
clause was genuinely intergenerational: The founding generation passed for the future a 
law it would not itself ever be bound by. 
203 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
204 See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
205 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 26-27 (1996) (discussing the Articles of Confederation 
government's limited ability to regulate external relations of any kind). 
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one vote" principle that undergirds the conception of democracy out-
lined in Part II. Banning the importation into the United States of 
human beings who would subsequently be denied all access to the 
political process and instead be treated, in Dred Scott's infamous 
words, "like an ordinary article of merchandise and property,''206 
increased the democratic character of the polity, even if it had no 
direct bearing on elections. 
It is also tempting to view the Slave Importation Clause not as a 
step towards abolition but rather as an inexcusable accommodation of 
slavery-an exemplar of William Lloyd Garrison's famous argument 
that the Constitution was "a Covenant with Death."207 After all, the 
decision to allow the transatlantic trade to continue for at least twenty 
more years temporarily sanctioned the murderous horrors of the 
"peculiar institution,"208 an accommodation made doubly damning by 
the Framers' choice to give it special status as the only provision in the 
Constitution exempt from amendment.209 To cap it all off, when 
paired with the Three-Fifths Clause, the Slave Importation Clause cre-
ated a perverse system of incentives that encouraged Southern states 
to import as many slaves as possible in the short run, in order to 
increase their political clout before the slave trade could come up for 
a vote in 1808.210 
But even if the Clause was, at some level, "a Covenant with 
Death," the opponents of slavery managed to strike a shrewd bargain. 
By using the power of time, they achieved a modest victory-the pos-
sibility of eventual abolition-that likely could not have been attained 
by other (peaceful) means. Excising all protections for the slave trade 
from the Constitution was probably not an option. At the Virginia 
ratifying conventions, Madison maintained that "[t]he Southern States 
[Georgia and the Carolinas] would not have entered into the Union of 
America without the temporary permission of that trade."211 The 
records of the Philadelphia Convention suggest that he was unfortu-
nately right. In the debates over the Slave Importation Clause, South 
206 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451 (1856). 
21Y7 See LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 3 (quoting Garrison). 
208 Approximately 15% of slaves died during each Middle Passage trip, and those that 
survived, of course, faced many more horrors in the New World. James Horn & Philip D. 
Morgan, Settlers and Slaves: European and African Migrations to Early Modern British 
America, in THE CREATION OF TIIE BRmsH ATLANTIC WORLD 19, 30 (Elizabeth Mancke 
& Carole Shammas eds., 2005). 
209 U.S. CoNsT. art. V. 
210 AMAR, supra note 8, at 90-91. 
211 3 THE DEBATES IN TIIE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 453-54 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827) (statement of James 
Madison). 
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Carolina representative John Rutledge put the matter bluntly, stating 
that the "true question" presented by slave importation was "whether 
the [Southern] States shall or shall not be parties to the Union."212 His 
colleagues reiterated this sentiment several times.213 
Without using a sunrise amendment, the alternatives available to 
the Framers were therefore either to call the Southern states' bluff 
and risk the very real possibility that they would leave the Union 
(potentially leading to violence and leaving the breakaway faction 
entirely free to continue importing slaves), or to make a permanent 
concession to the slave trade in the Constitution. By employing sun-
rise lawmaking, the Framers were instead able to give the proponents 
of slavery twenty years in return for the possibility of stopping impor-
tation for all time. And Congress did ultimately avail itself of this stra-
tegic accommodation by banning the slave trade on January 1, 1808-
the first day such an action was constitutionally permissible.214 
The real tragedy, therefore, was not so much that the Framers 
agreed to a sunrise provision that let the slave trade persist for twenty 
years, but rather that they failed to use comparable ingenuity to phase 
out other aspects of slavery.215 Many states in the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth centuries adopted gradual manumission schemes that 
placated slaveholders by deferring most of their effects to the 
future.216 Pennsylvania, for example, passed a law in 1780 that freed 
all slave children born after the statute's enactment on their twenty-
eighth birthdays.217 This type of reform was easier than immediate 
emancipation for a slave owner to accept, since it meant that no slaves 
would be freed for almost thirty years-and that many more would 
remain in bondage long after that. Indeed, even plantation-centered 
Virginia was willing to consider similar proposals as late as 1832.218 It 
stands to reason that the Framers might have had success promoting a 
212 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 364. 
213 See id. at 371, 373, 559. 
214 See An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves into Any Port or Place Within the 
Jurisdiction of the United States, from and After the First Day of January, in the Year of 
Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Eight, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807), available at 
Av ALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/sl004.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 
2015). 
215 See AMAR, supra note 6, at 476. 
216 See AMAR, supra note 8, at 352-53 (noting that New York, Connecticut, and New 
Jersey all employed such schemes). 
217 An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery (1780), reprinted in 1 LAWS OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1700-1781, at 838--43 (Alexander James Dallas ed., 
1797). 
218 AMAR, supra note 8, at 96. 
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comparable sunrise scheme at the national level if they had bothered 
to try.219 
The Slave Importation Clause is therefore more than a conces-
sion to slavery. It showcases how the power of time can peacefully 
accomplish goals that would otherwise require bloodshed to achieve, 
as ending slavery ultimately did. That a sunrise amendment was 
employed to eradicate the slave trade-and might plausibly have been 
used to do away with the evil of slavery altogether-speaks to the 
promise of the technique. 
C. Democracy-Restricting Sunrise: The Natural Born Citizen Clause 
The Slave Importation Clause and Amendments Twenty, Twenty-
Two, and Twenty-Seven present compelling illustrations of how one 
generation can use the power of time to bequeath a more democratic 
government to its successors when vested political interests would 
stand in the way of conventional attempts at reform.220 But at least 
one constitutional provision illustrates how sunrise amendments can 
restrict democracy. 
Article II, Section 1, Clause 5, commonly known as the "Natural 
Born Citizen Clause," stipulates that "[n]o Person except a natural 
born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the 
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of 
President."221 Since all citizens at the time of ratification were 
exempted from the "natural born citizen" requirement, the provision 
effectively operated as a "sunrise" disqualification of non-native citi-
zens from eligibility for the presidency.222 In 1789, all immigrants were 
allowed to hold the nation's highest office (assuming they met the 
219 See id. at 352-53. Note that Abraham Lincoln, by contrast, did vigorously advocate 
for such a plan several generations later, until it became apparent that war was inevitable. 
220 One could argue that the Seventeenth Amendment, which provides for direct 
election of Senators, should also be included in this group since it provides that "[t]his 
amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator 
chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII, cl. 
3. Yet this is not really a grandfather clause. It merely establishes that the natural reading 
of the preceding provisions, which do not seem to imply retroactive application, is the 
correct one. 
221 U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
222 There is some uncertainty over exactly how far this disqualification extends-
whether it applies to children of American parents living abroad, for example. The term 
"natural-born" is never given a precise definition in the Constitution, so its meaning at the 
Founding, or as modified by subsequent constitutional enactments like the Fourteenth 
Amendment, remains debated. See Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, 'Natural 
Born' in the USA: The Striking Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution's 
Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REv. 53, 89-108 
(2005) (discussing many potential ambiguities in the Natural-Born Citizen Clause's 
meaning). 
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other eligibility requirements); by the mid-nineteenth century, virtu-
ally none were. The Clause's full impact was therefore considerably 
delayed. 
The Clause's anti-immigrant stance fits poorly in an otherwise 
remarkably pro-immigrant Constitution.223 Why did the Framers 
choose to adopt such a nativist restriction on presidential eligibility, 
even as they moved away from the British practice of requiring legis-
lators, judges, and cabinet officers to be native-born?224 One piece of 
the answer may lie in the Natural Born Citizen Clause's sunrise quali-
ties. All of the foreign-born delegates at the Convention-and all 
foreign-born citizens in the nation at the time of ratification-were 
expressly exempted from the Clause's nativity requirement, which 
may have placated an important constituency that otherwise would 
have opposed the measure. 
Ironically, the nativity requirement was partly born of pro-
democratic sentiments. At the time of the Convention, many Ameri-
cans worried that a European noble would attempt to seize control of 
the newly independent republic.22s They may have had good reason to 
be concerned: in the months leading up to the Convention, the Presi-
dent of the Confederation, Nathaniel Gorham, actually sent a letter to 
Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of Frederick the Great, asking the 
German potentate whether he would be interested in venturing to the 
United States to become a constitutional monarch.226 Whether or not 
such an outcome was likely to materialize, the possibility grabbed hold 
of the American imagination. Throughout the summer of 1787, 
rumors circulated that the delegates at the Philadelphia Convention 
intended to appoint a foreign noble-the Bishop of Osnaburgh, 
second son of George III, according to one popular variant-as King 
of the United States.227 Indeed, Convention delegates were so con-
cerned about these rumors that some of them leaked an anonymous 
223 See AMAR, supra note 6, at 453-54 (arguing that the natural-born citizen 
requirement is inconsistent with the pro-immigrant "spirit of the Constitution"); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Natural Born Killjoy, LEGAL AFF. (Mar./Apr. 2004), http://legalaffairs.org/ 
issues/March-April-2004/argument_amar_marpar04.msp ("In a land of immigrants 
committed to the dream of equality, the Constitution's natural-born clause seems, well, un-
American."). 
224 AMAR, supra note 8, at 164. 
225 Id. at 164-65. 
226 See id. at 165; see also JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R42097, 
QUALIFICATIONS FOR PRESIDENT AND THE "NATURAL BORN" CmZENSHIP ELIGIBILITY 
REQUIREMENT 7 (2011) (describing contemporary rumors of such a letter); Michael 
Nelson, Constitutional Qualifications for President, 17 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 383, 395 
(1987) (same). 
227 See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
173 (1913). 
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newspaper report in August, reassuring the nation that "tho' we 
cannot, affirmatively, tell you what we are doing, we can, negatively, 
tell you what we are not doing-we never once thought of a king. "228 
The harshness of the natural-born-citizen requirement may have 
reflected the importance of combatting the threat posed by foreign 
royalty-and of quashing speculation about the Convention's own 
monarchical intentions. 229 
But couldn't these goals have been fulfilled with a less compre-
hensive exclusion? Surely a very long residency or citizenship require-
ment-twenty years, say-would have been enough to dissuade most 
European nobles from making a bid for the American presidency and 
ensure that any who did would have become effectively Americanized 
by the time they were eligible to run for the nation's highest office. In 
fact, such an approach was explicitly proposed at the Convention. The 
original draft of the presidential eligibility requirements mandated 
that the President shall be "a Citizen of the United States, and shall 
have been an Inhabitant thereof for Twenty one years."230 Only in the 
early days of September 1787 did a new draft from the Committee of 
Eleven swap this language for the modern formulation requiring 
natural-born citizenship; the revised text was subsequently adopted 
without debate.231 
The idea for the nativity requirement probably came from John 
Jay, who sent a letter to George Washington proposing such a policy 
earlier in the summer.232 The mystery, then, is why the Framers took 
up Jay's suggestion without much resistance when a less restrictive 
alternative lay right in front of them. One obvious answer is the afore-
mentioned need to demonstrate an emphatic anti-monarchical com-
mitment. But the sunrise nature of the nativity requirement made 
adoption of the proposal an easier choice than it might have otherwise 
been. The Committee of Eleven introduced the natural-born citizen 
restriction and the proviso exempting all citizens at the time of ratifi-
cation concurrently.233 This meant that from the moment debate com-
menced, the individuals who might have objected most vociferously to 
a provision barring immigrants from running for President-the seven 
228 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 74 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS]. 
229 AMAR, supra note 8, at 165 n.97; Nelson, supra note 226, at 395. 
230 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 367. 
231 MASKELL, supra note 226, at 5. 
232 See Jill A. Pryor, Note, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: 
An Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 888 
(1988) (discussing how Jay's letter "is generally assumed to be the source" of the Natural-
Bom Citizen Clause). 
233 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 494. 
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foreign-born delegates at the Convention234-were all exempted from 
the measure's restrictions. If the clause had instead taken immediate 
effect, it is likely that the Caribbean-born Alexander Hamilton, or one 
of his fellow immigrants, would have stood up to object.235 
This somewhat speculative suggestion finds support in the records 
of the Convention's earlier debates over congressional eligibility 
requirements.236 In the midst of the discussion over whether and 
under what conditions immigrants should be allowed to serve in 
Congress, James Wilson gave a strikingly personal speech on what citi-
zenship restrictions meant to him as a Scottish immigrant: 
[H]e rose with feelings which were perhaps peculiar; mentioning the 
circumstances of his not being a native, and the possibility, if the 
ideas of some gentlemen should be pursued, of his being incapaci-
tated from holding a place under the very Constitution which he 
had shared in the trust of making. He remarked the illiberal com-
plexion which the motion would give the System . . . and the dis-
couragement [and] mortification [immigrants] must feel from the 
degrading discrimination, now proposed. He had himself exper-
ienced this mortification. On his removal into Maryland, he found 
himself, from defect of residence, under certain legal incapacities, 
which never ceased to produce chagrin .... 237 
Wilson clearly felt the sting of nativity requirements very person-
ally, and made sure that his colleagues understood this. While he was 
unsuccessful in removing all anti-immigrant restrictions on holding 
office from the Constitution, his personal appeals did help secure a 
measure of victory: The congressional citizenship requirements ulti-
mately adopted-seven years for the House and nine for the Senate-
were short enough that no delegate at the Convention was affected by 
them.238 It is not hard to imagine Wilson, or one of his fellow immi-
grants, making a similar speech had the Committee of Eleven 
returned with a natural-born-citizen requirement for the presidency 
that made no exception for foreigners like them. The Natural Born 
Citizen Clause's sunrise-like proviso may have been the price of their 
silence. 
234 These were Robert Morris (England), Pierce Butler, Thomas Fitzsimons, James 
McHenry, and William Paterson (Ireland), James Wilson (Scotland), and Alexander 
Hamilton (Nevis). See AMAR, supra note 8, at 164 & n.93. 
235 Instead, Hamilton was actually one of the first to endorse a natural-born-citizen 
requirement combined with an exemption for current citizens. See 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, 
supra note 228, at 629. 
236 See Pryor, supra note 232, at 890. 
237 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 237. 
238 See Nelson, supra note 226, at 394 (noting that no delegate at the Convention had 
been a resident for fewer than fourteen years). 
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It also helped mollify the fears of broader immigrant resistance to 
the Constitution that had tempered some Framers' nativist sentiments 
earlier in the summer. During the debates over congressional eligi-
bility for foreign-born citizens, Edmund Randolph observed that 
"[m]any foreigners ... who would be affected by such a regulation, 
would enlist themselves under the banners of hostility to the proposed 
System."239 Accordingly, he said he could tolerate citizenship require-
ments of up to seven years, "but no further."240 Madison similarly 
argued that imposing harsh restrictions on immigrant eligibility for 
Congress would "expose us to the reproaches of all those who should 
be affected by it . . . and would unnecessarily enlist among the 
Adversaries of the reform a very considerable body of Citizens. "241 
The sunrise-like Natural Born Citizen Clause cleverly skirted 
around these concerns of immigrant opposition by barring no one who 
was eligible to vote on the Constitution from seeking the presidency. 
In fact, from the short-term perspective of the delegates at 
Philadelphia, the final version of the Clause, with its delayed categor-
ical ban, was actually more inclusive than the twenty-one-year citizen-
ship requirement it replaced. The earlier measure would have kept 
three Convention delegates-including Hamilton, who only came to 
the United States in 1772-from being immediately eligible to run for 
President.242 
In and of itself, there was nothing wrong with the Framers' deci-
sion to recognize the patriotism of their foreign-born colleagues with 
an exemption from the natural born citizen requirement. As Joseph 
Story later remarked, the carve-out was duly inserted "out of respect 
to those distinguished revolutionary patriots, who were born in a for-
eign land, and yet had entitled themselves to high honours in their 
adopted country."243 But as constitutional lawmakers, these foreign-
born delegates at the Convention were charged not only with 
speaking for themselves and all other immigrants living in the United 
239 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 237. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 271. 
242 Nelson, supra note 226, at 394. An interesting demonstration of the important role 
that interdelegate comity played in the determination of eligibility requirements is the 
differential success of the Natural Born Citizen Clause's current-citizen exemption, and 
Gouverneur Morris's attempt to exempt current citizens from the congressional citizenship 
requirements, which narrowly failed. 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 272. 
Perhaps the reason that Morris's proposal was not adopted, whereas the presidential 
eligibility exemption passed without debate, was that the latter freed the delegates from 
having to disqualify any of their fellows from political office, whereas the former did not, 
since all delegates already met the congressional citizenship requirements. 
243 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1473, at 332-33 (1833). 
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States in 1787, but also for all the future generations of immigrants 
who might one day "entitle themselves to high honors in their adopted 
country."244 They did not do this. Instead, the use of sunrise law-
making allowed the Framers to avoid the immediate political conse-
quences of the Natural Born Citizen Clause's inevitable exclusion of 
all the worthy immigrants who would subsequently arrive at the new 
nation's shores. 
It is open to debate whether preventing immigrants from running 
for President is a wise policy. Most of the Framers appear to have 
believed that it was; many modern commentators are more skep-
tical.245 Even if we take no position on the substance of the Natural 
Born Citizen Clause, however, our analysis suggests that there was 
something wrong with the Framers' decision to subject only the 
future, and not the present, to the nativity requirement. By doing so, 
they were able to avoid opposition from their immigrant contempo-
raries-in other words, to sidestep the hurdles of democratic account-
ability by eschewing self-legislation even as they legislated for the 
future. The resulting democratic deficit was complete: No individual 
affected by the measure had the opportunity to vote on it. Nor could 
future immigrants disenfranchised by the Clause rely on a kind of vir-
tual representation by the immigrants of the Revolutionary genera-
tion, since these Founding-era immigrants were exempted from the 
Clause's effects. By imposing such a substantive policy choice on the 
future-and only on the future-the authors of the Natural Born 
Citizen Clause violated the trustee relationship in which sunrise 
lawmakers must stand to their progeny, denying others an autonomy 
they claimed for themselves. 
CONCLUSION: MORNING IN AMERICA? 
George Washington presided over the Constitutional Convention 
in an intricately carved mahogany chair, adorned, at the top, with a 
gilded image of a half-obscured sun.246 As the Framers affixed their 
signatures to their final draft in mid-September 1787, ending their 
work in Philadelphia, Benjamin Franklin famously remarked: "I have 
.. often ... looked at that [image] behind the President without 
244 James Wilson should certainly have recognized this failure of virtual representation; 
he would later remind his fellow delegates at the Pennsylvania ratification convention that 
they were representatives "not merely of the present age, but of future times .... " 2 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 431. 
245 See, e.g., Duggin & Collins, supra note 222. 
246 For an image of the famous chair, see The Rising Sun Armchair (George 
Washington's Chair), USmsTORY.ORG (July 4, 1995), http://www.ushistory.org/more/ 
sun.htm. 
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being able to tell whether it was rising or setting: But now at length I 
have the happiness to know that it is a rising and not a setting sun."247 
Sunrise amendments can also take on different, and divergent, 
meanings. On the one hand, they can vindicate the promise of demo-
cratic constitutionalism. By inducing legislators to act on broad-
minded considerations rather than parochial interests, they provide a 
promising way to broaden the sphere of democratic participation 
through the Article V process, even in the midst of today's partisan 
gridlock. Much of the history of sunrise lawmaking in the Constitution 
showcases this potential. 
Yet sunrise amendments can also accomplish less laudable ends. 
When the present makes law exclusively for the future, it legislates 
without the normal constraints of democratic accountability. It can 
use this freedom to facilitate future self-government, but it can also 
use it to exploit or inappropriately steer its progeny, in violation of its 
proper role as the future's trustee. 
A sunrise lawmaker is, in this sense, similar to Washington at the 
pivotal moment when Franklin wondered whether the great general's 
sun was rising or falling. Washington likely could have chosen to 
become a benevolent monarch or dictator, trusting his own seemingly 
incorruptible judgment over the uncertainty of democratic rule. He 
could also have erred in the opposite direction by refusing to preside 
over the Constitutional Convention, thus denying his imprimatur to 
this unprecedented experiment in popular sovereignty. Fortunately, 
like his idol Cincinnatus, he forsook the chance to rule alone, but did 
actively facilitate the growth of a democratic United States.248 
Constitutional lawmakers today should show a similar combina-
tion of boldness and self-restraint in working toward a more perfect 
union. Though they must not deny political autonomy to the future-
as the drafters of the Natural Born Citizen Clause did-neither can 
they abdicate their responsibility to promote democratic renewal 
through constitutional means. In the present circumstances of consti-
tutional stasis, it is perhaps only through amendments passed for the 
future that we can realize the promise of American democracy. 
247 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 648 (letter of James Madison to Thomas 
Jefferson relating Franklin's remarks). 
248 See David Boaz, The Man Who Would Not Be King, CATO INST. (Feb. 20, 2006), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/man-who-would-not-be-king (recounting 
how George III, when told that Washington would step down from power to return to his 
farm, replied, "If he does that, he will be the greatest man in the world"). 
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